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25 APRIL 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

Arms Control

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The same view," is pointed out. "The USSR has consistently taken several important steps in the field of arms control. But the United States has not given a positive reply to these initiatives."

One fact, in the (SALT)-negotiations of the Group of Governmental Experts L. 1978 and 7. 1979, has been said that U.S. Congress should "see the development (acceleration) of anti-missile weapons." A letter means for the adoption of such a decision, according to it, in fact, in the opinion of the legislators, continuation of the said system of weapons "will only lead to an escalation of the arms race." According to a report by the (SALT) committee, President Reagan is awaiting for a United Nations in consultation in the holding of anti-missile weapons in the next 3 years.

And American diplomats across President Reagan's extensive "strategic defense initiative" aimed at elimination of nuclear weapons. Evidence of this is given by a noticeable public opinion poll held at the end of the fall of 1979. The majority of respondents believed that the US was a "step in the wrong direction," was a report by the editor. In Soviet Union, executive director of the organization, stressed: "In other words, this will show that the country's attention was 'in' to 'out' now."

1979

1979 1979/1980

2. Challenge existed in January 19, this year will increase the expenditure of the Federal Government and thus administrative (1980) in the U.S. we observed a. Economically and politically. Since in the new theory, the challenge was a kind of the state period we also refer to the state's challenge will be used to experience directed at creating and defining a legitimate culture even with specialized content.

[illegible]

2. Passage to the air was never planned to deliver extreme types of engines to other types and conditions for testing on the Soviet Union. After the second time the captured engines were in 1945, when the USA got news about the Soviet air engine program, the idea of capturing them, which has been realized by the Passage to a long time, began being implemented after the Soviet administration was in power and put forward the "start work" program.

1

It is an interesting fact along with the statistics on freight forwarding forwarded the U.S. freight forwarding to go the same time shipping up the percentage increase of other across the whole range of the market index. The U.S. F.W. F.W. has moved from its last 3 years 9-12 strategic freight has been used with 1,000 million units loaded. That number will now rise to 1,200. The U.S. freight forwarding has been expanded with the 9-12, a new strategic freight, and another—the "freight" freight—for its freight. The introduction of the U.S. freight forwarding is also being moved up.

The same newspaper reports that the U.S. Armed Forces will receive the MX ICBM ahead of schedule. The development [razrabotka] of another missile, Midgetman, is being completed. The deployment of the U.S. medium-range nuclear missile facilities in Europe continues.

In 1984 the U.S. Administration approved the idea, nurtured by certain circles for many years, of creating a long-term orbiting space station. This space installation, on whose creation [sozdaniye] the administration is spending \$11 billion, is to ensure a permanent U.S. presence in space for military purposes. With good reason the NASA director called this station the "cornerstone" of the "star wars" program being developed [razrabatyvayemaya] by the Pentagon. In conjunction with the space aircraft, whose creation [sozdaniye] is also being taken care of by the Pentagon, the station will in practice represent a space-based intelligence-strike complex capable of resolving strategic tasks.

The foreign press points primarily to the possibility of the station being used as a delivery vehicle for laser weapons, nuclear installations, missiles, electromagnetic guns, and so forth.

The space shuttle is being used for "star wars" programs. By the way, the catastrophe that befell one aircraft in that series—the Challenger—confirmed the fears of those who believe that a technical error in the SDI system could lead to irreversible consequences for mankind.

As the journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY reports, the United States is planning new experiments in space in the near future, this time using laser weapons.

It should be noted that this type of weapon is no longer science fiction. On 6 September last year the White Sands test range (in New Mexico) held the first test of the "Miracle" chemical laser, whose beam burned through the shell of a Titan-2 missile at a distance of 1 km. A new 5 million watt laser is being prepared to replace the 2 million watt chemical laser.

The U.S. press reports that the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory is developing [razrabatyvayet] a nuclear triggered X-ray laser. This weapon, named Excalibur, has undergone its first tests at the nuclear test range in Nevada. Let us note here that the X-ray laser is essentially a new type of nuclear weapon, whose launch into space is banned by the 1963 and 1967 international treaties. However, the United States ignores the fact.

The successors to the creators of the first atomic bombs—the physicists of Los Alamos and the scientists of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory—are working on a rail gun deployed in space, according to the foreign press. The second echelon of the wide-scale ABM system will also form part of the transatlantic strategists' strike-space scenario. It includes orbiting space facilities armed with electromagnetic guns whose projectiles, it is calculated, will reach speeds of 40 km per second, and with small self-guiding missiles.

Such are the Pentagon's plans for the creation [sozdaniye] of new types of weapons for the "star wars" program. It is obvious that they can only have dangerous consequences for mankind.

The USSR counters the nuclear madness with reason. The Soviet Union firmly adheres to the course of seeking significant practical arms limitation and reduction measures.

It is still possible to call a halt now, while new arms systems remain for the most part in scientists' and specialists' minds and on their drawing boards or are undergoing tests. As the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress said, it is extremely necessary while there is still time to seek a real solution which would provide a guarantee against the transfer of the arms race to space. The "star wars" program must not be allowed to be used either to stimulate a continued arms race or as an obstacle on the path of radical disarmament.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1330

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR NOTES OPPOSITION TO FRG SDI PARTICIPATION

Peace Groups, Scientists

LD122306 Moscow TASS in English 2025 GMT 12 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn March 12 TASS—Horst Trapp, representative of the "Krefeld Initiative," the largest and most influential association of peace champions in the FRG, has urged the FRG Government to disembark from the disastrous path of participation in the U.S. SDI programme. This militaristic project shall not be allowed to be turned into reality. The FRG's renunciation of any participation in the preparations for "star wars" would contribute to creating a healthier international situation. This step would be West Germany's positive contribution to materialisation of the "Geneva spirit," contribute to the success of the Soviet-American disarmament talks.

A statement by the association of prominent West German scientists "forum of natural scientists for peace and disarmament" has been issued in Munich. Representatives of the academic community have declared in that document against the U.S. plans to militarise outer space and against any participation of Bonn in Washington's outer space adventure. Jurgen Altman, member of the organisation's board, said that its most important political and scientific objective is to prevent thermonuclear war. It is particularly urgent in that connection to prevent a militarisation of outer space. Space weapons cannot ensure security from nuclear missiles, but can dangerously destabilise the strategic situation and increase the threat of war. The task of preventing war calls for political solutions. New types of weapons only hamper the effort to ensure peace.

Mass Protests

LD271954 Moscow TASS in English 1941 GMT 27 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn March 27 TASS—TASS correspondent Gennadiy Kulbitskiy reports:

The news agency DPA reports from Washington that an agreement was today signed there between West Germany and the USA on the participation of West German companies in research under the American "Strategic Defense Initiative." It was signed by West German Economics Minister Martin Bangemann, paying a visit to the USA, and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. The text of the agreement will not be made public. It is noted in Bonn in this context that the fears that the agreement would be secret have now come true.

The news that the agreement on West Germany's contribution to the U.S. sinister plans to prepare for "star wars" has provoked mass protests from opposition parties and the democratic public of the country.

"The signing of a secret agreement with Washington on West Germany's participation in the implementation of SDI marks a tragic day for the Federal Republic," a notable disarmament expert of the Social Democratic faction, Hermann Scheer, said in an interview to the bulletin PARLAMENTARISCH-POLITISCHES-PRESIDIUM. "The West German government's political and economic support for Washington plans on 'star wars' preparations is doing grave damage not only to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons taking place in Geneva but also to West German eastern policy as a whole."

"Having concluded a secret accord with the USA on participation in SDI," the chairman of the Greens delegates' group in the defense commission of the West German Bundestag, Torsten Lange, has stated here, "the West German Government has assumed in full political responsibility for the implementation of such a dangerous project, which will give the United States the first strike capability."

More than 160 employees of the Philips Research Laboratory in Hamburg have today sent Chancellor Kohl an open letter stating their absolute refusal to participate in work on the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative." The letter says that the allegations that the development of defense systems will give more security are deception of the public. Instead, efforts should be made to achieve concrete steps towards disarmament, primarily in the field of nuclear weapons.

Rau Cited

LD272213 Moscow TASS in English 2155 GMT 27 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn March 27 TASS--Johannes Rau, prime minister of North Rhine-Westphalia and the leading Social Democratic candidate for the post of federal chancellor, characterized as inadmissible the agreement signed in Washington today on West Germany's participation in the "Strategic Defense Initiative."

The fact that it has been reached so hastily, Rau said, is contrary to the interests of the Federal Republic. According to him, the interests of West Germany would be promoted by efforts to avert the arms race in outer space.

Schmidt Comments

DISPATCH NUMBER T888 In English 0749 GMT 7 Apr 88

[Text] Tokyo April 7 T888 -- President West German politician, German Federal Chancellor of the FRG Helmut Schmidt, has denounced Bush's declaration to join the Reagan anti-war program. In an interview to the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI he said that details of that accord are kept secret which causes serious suspicion on the part of the West German public as to the real aims of the agreement. Schmidt stressed that Western Europe and Japan should not give premature obligations on joining the Strategic Defense Initiative since it will hardly help strengthen their security.

/R309

CSO: 5200/1130

TOP SECRET//SI//NF

UNITED STATES OF THE FRENCH STATEMENT ON SSI PART

LEONARDI/24 Source PART 10 to Section 4 Apr 88 Final Version p 4

[Dear] 1988 statement to the FRC, U.S. Government, outlined the challenge of Strategic Initiative S.I. (initiated on 4 April), and its accordance with international and the following day statement:

Several agreements were concluded between the FRC and U.S. Government to distinguish as [?] from the procedure relating to FRC files and "initiatives" participation to the U.S. program for the creation (enrichment) of space strike systems.

It must be known to the FRC Government that this program, called the "Strategic Defense Initiative," has nothing to do with the aim of defense. It concerns an attempt to create (enrichment) a new dangerous class of weapons, satellites (enrichment) to live under possibilities, which has been called upon to become an element of the U.S. overall offensive potential. The appearance of space strike weapons would inevitably bring to the table a serious destabilization of the strategic situation.

It also is quite clear that the U.S. SSI program's aim is to enhance the defense of America's most acute problem: namely, the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Instead, the SSI program is aimed at building up nuclear and military confrontations in general in the world, including the European Continent.

The FRC Government also is well aware that the U.S. side, having embarked on the path of creating (enrichment) space strike systems, including large-scale SSI systems with space-based elements, is openly pushing to undermine the 1972 SSI Treaty with its the cornerstone of the whole nuclear arms limitation and reduction process.

Having accepted U.S. medium-range missiles on its territory, and are limiting itself in the SSI program, the FRC is assuming great responsibility for participating in a chain of actions by the U.S. that in their very essence are profoundly hostile to the cause of international security, peace, and cooperation. It must realize that the Soviet Union cannot but draw the corresponding conclusions of a political and defense nature from this.

The arms race and participation in military preparations against the socialist countries will not help the FRC find a solution to any of the issues pertaining to its present or future.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee. The names are listed in alphabetical order, and the addresses are listed below each name. The list includes the names of the members of the committee, the names of the members of the sub-committee, and the names of the members of the advisory committee. The addresses are listed in the same order as the names.

2. The second part of the document is a list of the names and addresses of the members of the committee. The names are listed in alphabetical order, and the addresses are listed below each name. The list includes the names of the members of the committee, the names of the members of the sub-committee, and the names of the members of the advisory committee. The addresses are listed in the same order as the names.

CONFIDENTIAL

Statement of [Name] to [Committee]

[Name]

[Address]

[Text block containing the first paragraph of the statement, starting with 'I am...']

[Text block containing the second paragraph of the statement, starting with 'I am...']

[Text block containing the third paragraph of the statement, starting with 'I am...']

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CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET COMINT

TOP SECRET COMINT WITH LATER REPORTS IN THE CONTRACTS

WASHINGTON Bureau T-10 to England T-100 OFF 20 Mar 68

[Top] Tokyo March 20 T-100-T-100 correspondent facility. Japanese reports:

On receiving a group of foreign correspondents, Tetsu Hirata, president of the major Japanese company "Nippon Kasei," was quite frank with them. During the visit, he told the T-100 correspondent too, together with other journalists, that he had planned to visit the headquarters of the company—one of the world's biggest producers of sophisticated optical equipment, that the question of the company's participation in the implementation of the U.S. "Technology Release Initiative" had practically been settled.

He also said that he was flying to Washington one of these days to find out the terms of existing contracts. "Of course, we oppose the murder of innocent people. However, I want you to get us right: In business the most important thing to us is that the undertaking be profitable and large in scope." Tetsu Hirata was obviously sure that the Pentagon was going to offer him exactly this kind of deal that would bring his company many more millions of dollars.

On the side of the "Nippon Kasei" is ready to change its mild position of a producer of scientific equipment for the increasingly reputation of a "death manufacturer."

T. Hirata is not the only one in Japan who will yield to the dollar attraction. Soon he leads a whole group of senior executives of the biggest Japanese companies to going to Washington. They intend to determine where they would prefer to invest their capitals—in the production of rocket launchers, military equipment of tracking systems.

On the other side, the Pentagon is going to use the optical elements developed by "Nippon Kasei" in the production of super-computers for controlling a fleet of nuclear submarines, while the achievements of the scientists working for the company in the development of videorecorders can well be used for aiming missiles and for laser installations.

However, according to ASAC, some Japanese businessmen are still afraid of getting into a trap laid by the Pentagon which seeks to get hold of the technological secrets of Japan. The U.S. Defense Secretary C. McNamara arrives in Tokyo in the coming weeks to convince them otherwise. Together with members of the Japanese Government he will point to growing evidence the "practical advantages" of preparations for space wars.

END

CSN 5000/1180

REF ID: A66666

REPORTAGE ON THE DISCUSSION ON THE AGREEMENT

Discussion News

DIS11251 Hamburg AND Information in German 1200 GMT 20 Mar 68

[Text] Chancellor Kohl has once again discussed the SDI concept in a discussion round in the Chancellor's Office this morning. Apart from the Chancellor, Foreign Minister Genscher, Defense Minister Werner, Economic Minister Bangemann, and Minister in the Chancellor's Office Schmidt attended the meeting. Bangemann will travel to Washington again next week so as to finalize the desired U.S.-FR agreement on technology transfer and the participation of German companies in the research project for space missile defense.

Following the meeting, Genscher and Bangemann informed the FDP fraction in the Bundestag this morning. The FDP is irritated that Chancellor Kohl had announced that the basic agreement has been reached together with U.S. Defense Secretary McChesney in Bonn on Wednesday in Hoffmannsheim. FDP quarters said that they are not particularly happy that Economic Minister Bangemann, who had been instructed by the cabinet to conduct the negotiations has thus been by-passed, and that controversial issues continued to exist.

Spokesman Comments

DIS11601 Hamburg DPA to German 1305 GMT 20 Mar 68

[Excerpt] [No location as received] 20 Mar (DPA) — Friedrich Oet, the government spokesman, has stated that Economic Minister Bangemann will negotiate in Washington on some points about SDI which are still open. "But these are points which have been discussed within the government." Oet today in Duesterblaudfunk referred to the fact that a ministerial conversation on this had taken place on Friday evening in the chancellery, with Bangemann and Genscher taking part. Within the government camp there was "good cooperative work."

The questions still to be negotiated are, according to Oet, of great interest to Bonn, but "not so very tricky anymore." On his previous trips to Washington, Bangemann had "conducted good negotiations" and will thus bring them to a conclusion. The government spokesman refuted the charge of a "secret agreement" on SDI. If this were so, "then no one would know about it." In both agreements with the United States it was a matter of keeping the text confidential. "This is altogether customary between governments," he added, referring to the agreements between the United States and Great Britain in the same field. Parliament and the public would be informed about the agreements' content. Asked whether there were aspects in the SDI agreement relating to military research, Oet said yes.

Defense Strategic Environment

[Chairman] George Bush: I am pleased to have you here today. (11:00 AM, 11 April 86)

[Chairman] and Defense Secretary Richard Cheney to participate further in the "Defense" program that we have -- (continued)

[Chairman] [Defense] I'll be in the 1000 Defense Planning Group meeting in Marching. It would be good to have you there in the 1000 Group. What has happened the day?

[Cheney] I would not say that there has been a change. It has only become clear that the defense has changed beyond comparison. After previous time the Congress, they had included about 100 billion-dollar weapons in their co-sponsor and, all this was proposed by the present majority, a permanent discussion with us in the strategic political arena of possible deployment will go in consultation with the rest of the Congress. In other words, there is a dialogue, there is information, and there is consultation. There is also consideration of the Congress' stated interests at this stage of the program.

[Chairman] However, is that not a real change? Previously the Congress would meet without about the information. I remember that after the first round of questions we repeatedly pressed the Congress' readiness to discuss information.

[Chairman] Is that change you are right. The Congress has opened up considerably, probably under the leadership that to such a policy they will probably allow more support for their policies. I can only say that I believe it very much, because I am one of those who would have had the fullest possible information, for consultation, and for discussion about the program's future.

[Chairman] Now that you have been in Congress, how do you feel about the American people?

[Cheney] Ah. I would not say that. I am not a politician, and others are too. However, as the war has to be won, the Congress has to consider their partners' security interests. The last two things that they have done are to extend the 100 billion-dollar program in defense, and, especially, also to extend protection for their own soldiers and their dependents.

[Chairman] What would you say to you, the military-industrial or military-industrial side of the 100, or 100 as a security policy program?

[Cheney] Clearly, 100 is primarily a defense program, which means that the strategic, the security policy aspect should clearly be in the foreground. The technological aspect follows, then the economic. However, I would say again that one is to introduce -- after successful research and -- it would change not only the strategy of the military, but would have a significant effect with considerable countries, strategy, and foreign policy implications. The point was just the very technological for it. It is a strategic policy program.

[Chairman] Does that mean that the Congress has the members' special program? In the past we have repeatedly been criticized in connection with the 100 (Europe Defense Initiative) program. You are considered a supporter of an extended European anti-aircraft system. Will it be more sophisticated, or what?

[Cheney] I have never had anything to do with 100, and I never wanted to. Anti-aircraft defense involves the idea of being able to monitor and also defend but also

unmanned flying objects. That is not only logical, it is a necessity. It will not become superfluous at all. On the contrary, if the Americans include intermediate-range and short-range weapons in their SDI system, it will be done in the framework of a multistage complex. It is a conventional matter and takes place on the ground. It will not become superfluous because of SDI, especially if the Americans include short- and intermediate-range missiles at our insistence. One must be aware of technology exchange, because in working on SDI technologies could be discovered that might increase the capacity of extended antiaircraft defense.

[Fechner] If you were to assess the recent talks, what would you say?

[Woerner] With a view to SDI?

[Fechner] The dialogue in general.

[Woerner] I would say that it is going on as never before in the alliance. As to arms control and SDI, we are in the midst of talks, and the Americans are very open, obviously trying to indicate to the allies that they want close cooperation.

Outgoing Soviet Envoy

LD241318 Hamburg DPA in German 1225 GMT 24 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 24 Mar (DPA) -- Vladimir Semenov, Moscow's ambassador in Bonn for many years, will leave Bonn at the end of April. Semenov announced this today (Monday) at a rare and probably final press conference in Bonn on the occasion of the presentation of a volume of documents about the 27th CPSU Congress. In the future he will be working as adviser on foreign affairs in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The 75-year-old Semenov represented his country for 7 and 1/2 years as ambassador in Bonn. His successor will be the Soviet delegation leader in the Geneva negotiations group on space weapons, Yuliy Kvitsinskiy.

Despite a possible agreement between the Federal Republic and the United States on participation in SDI, he said, the Soviet Union did not wish to end economic cooperation with the Federal Republic. Relations between his country and the Federal Republic would certainly be damaged by such an agreement.

Semenov said that he could not say how the U.S. nuclear test in Nevada last weekend would affect relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The explosion has aroused indignation and sharp criticism in the Soviet press. Concrete decisions on this would, however, be considered at the appropriate time in Moscow.

Bangemann Interview

LD230840 Hamburg DPA in German 0406 GMT 23 Mar 86

[Text] Frankfurt, 23 Mar (DPA) -- In FDP Chairman and Economics Minister Martin Bangemann's view the strived for agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic regarding the SDI program will not impair the East-West detente dialogue.

Speaking on the Frankfurt discussion program on Hesse Radio today, Bangemann said the Federal Government, the FDP, and particularly Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher have always taken care to negotiate questions relating to the transfer of technology but not the linked strategic questions such as disarmament and alliance problems. The cabinet's decisions are based upon the assumption that the agreements should fit into the process of disarmament talks.

Regarding the forthcoming continuation of his talks on SDI in Washington, Bangemann said Chancellor Helmut Kohl's meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger in Grafenwoehr has contributed to moving things forward. But he added, things are not yet concluded. Some important questions still need to be negotiated this coming week.

SPD's Scheer Criticizes Agreement

LD221414 Hamburg DPA in German 1151 GMT 22 Mar 86

[Text] Waiblingen, 22 Mar (DPA) — Hermann Scheer, disarmament policy spokesman of the SPD Bundestag group, has rejected the planned agreement with the United States on participation in SDI as a "gross attack on the rights of parliament". Moreover, the agreement is "incompatible with basic constitutional principles", Scheer said today in Waiblingen (Baden-Wuerttemberg). The Federal Government's announcement that only the relevant committees will be informed about the agreement bears out the worst fears of a secret agreement being prepared while by passing the public and the Bundestag.

Scheer particularly criticized the fact that according to the planned agreements, German firms but not the Bundestag will be fully informed about the course of future German-American technology transfer. As a result, important sections of the German economy will become a matter of secrecy to the Bundestag. The SPD politician gave notice of a "constitutional examination" of this "secret diplomacy".

SPD's Voight Remarks

LD221409 Hamburg DPA in German 1114 GMT 22 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 22 Mar (DPA) — Karsten Voight, foreign policy spokesman of the SPD Bundestag group, has called on the Federal Government not to sign an SDI agreement with the United States during the Easter parliamentary recess. Voight said today on Radio Free Berlin that it was a clear duty not to conclude any agreement without the Bundestag and its committees being able to form an opinion. The fact that the Federal Government evidently intends to reach a result during the Easter recess is a lapse of parliamentary customs.

The SPD deputy also underlined his party's opposition to the agreement which Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP) is to sign next week in Washington. From the American side it is clear that it is a military agreement, Voight said. He pointed out that U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger had held talks with Federal Chancellor Kohl and with Bangemann. The West German side, on the other hand, is attempting to disguise the true substance of the agreement. As a result of its behavior the Federal Government is agreeing in principle to the United States' basic strategic considerations.

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CSO: 5200/2666

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S BANGEMANN, WEINBERGER SIGN SDI AGREEMENTS

Agreement Reached

LD271911 Hamburg DPA in German 1751 GMT 27 Mar 86

[Text] Washington, 27 Mar (DPA) -- Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann has expressed his satisfaction at the signing of the two agreements with the United States on participation of German industry in SDI research and on the expansion of technology transfer. After he and U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger had signed the documents today in Washington, Bangemann told the press that the negotiations had not been easy, but the content of the agreements squared with what was decided by the cabinet.

In connection with SDI, Bangemann stressed that the conditions for participation by German companies are now "possible." The agreement provides for, among other things, German firms bidding for SDI research projects on the same conditions as U.S. companies. Research knowledge which they bring remains protected, and in the case of new knowledge the same principles will apply to German companies as apply to U.S. firms.

Bangemann said both agreements contain a "nondiscrimination clause". The Berlin clause in the agreement on technology transfer corresponds to those in already existing agreements. The technology agreement also provides for the use of special representatives, who will meet regularly but who, when necessary, could also arrange for talks at short notice. In the Federal Economics Ministry a body will be set up which is intended to serve as an office to assist German firms interested in taking part in SDI research.

Genscher Reported 'Satisfied'

LD271736 Hamburg DPA in German 1630 GMT 27 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 27 Mar (DPA) -- West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), who has opposed any state participation by the Federal Republic in the SDI research program from the start, is satisfied with the agreements reached in Washington. It has been stated in Bonn today that Genscher sees the demands of the cabinet decision of 18 December as having been fulfilled. Even though Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger signed for the U.S. side, the agreements are of a purely nonmilitary nature, and state participation or public money from the Federal Republic is not envisaged.

Also important in the interest of East-West relations was the expressed commitment and clarification that the research would be kept within the limits of the ABM Treaty.

Genscher had emphasized this "ABM compatibility" even before negotiations. It was stressed in Bonn that a bilateral agreement with Washington on strategic and security policy questions was excluded from the start, because such agreements could only be reached jointly in the NATO alliance. Security policy agreements between Bonn and Washington alone would "take the alliance apart" and would be damaging for European and for German-French relations.

The agreements are reported not to contain a political preamble. At the beginning reference is made to previous statements by the Federal Government on the SDI program which affirm the demand that the arms race should be ended on earth and prevented in space. The link between the agreement on general technology transfer and the agreement on SDI is established through a letter from Weinberger referring to both agreements. The same is true of the Berlin clause, which is only contained in the agreement on the transfer of technology.

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CS0: 5200/2666

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG OFFICIALS COMMENT ON SDI AGREEMENTS WITH U.S.

Bangemann Explains Agreements

LD281324 Hamburg DPA in German 1209 GMT 28 Mar 86

[Text] Frankfurt, 28 Mar (DPA) -- The two agreements with the United States on participation by the German business sector in SDI research and on the extension of technology transfer correspond fully to the cabinet's guidelines. This was stressed by Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP) in Frankfurt on Good Friday after he had returned from the signing ceremony in the United States. The result also corresponds fully with the FDP's views.

After initial difficulties, the German delegation had been able to make the U.S. partners understand that there was no question of participation by the Federal Republic in SDI and that there would not be any budget resources available. The two agreements had only set out the framework within which German firms can take part in research projects while maintaining equal opportunities.

The establishment of a consultation center and a information center was contained in the agreement on bilateral technology transfer. The German information center for firms to apply to would be in the Economics Ministry, and the American one was envisioned to be in the Pentagon. Differences are to be dealt with by regular meetings. This agreement also contains the Berlin clause. The SDI agreement provides guidelines which are intended to protect German contractors. The most important result is the quality opportunity. This memorandum does not contain military questions.

According to Bangemann's explanations, the critical points in the negotiations were, above all, the different starting positions of the Americans and Germans; the problems over Berlin; the consultation mechanism, and a series of issues concerning the maintenance of secrecy. The text of the agreements will not be published, but the Bundestag committees are to be briefed in detail.

According to the economics minister's estimates, there are around 50 to 60 German firms which could take part in the U.S. research projects. The volume of orders depends completely on the companies' decisions about their possible participation. Any figure would be pure speculation at the current stage.

Government Spokesman's Remarks

LD281330 Hamburg DPA in German 1252 GMT 28 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 28 Mar (DPA) -- The Federal Government on Friday in Bonn welcomed the "successful conclusion" of the German-U.S. negotiations on an agreement on participation by German firms and research institutions in the U.S. program for a missile defense system in space (SDI), and on overall questions of technology transfer. Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP), who signed the agreement in Washington, will, it was said in Bonn, make a government statement on it to the Bundestag after the Easter recess.

According to government spokesman Friedhelm Ost, it has been made possible after 9 months of "careful preliminary talks and intensive negotiations" to improve considerably the requirements and conditions for cooperation by private German industry and research with U.S. industry and research within the framework of the SDI program and in general terms.

It had been the Federal Government's aim to increase the prospects for German industry and research, whose task it is now to make use of the possibilities for cooperation with the United States on the basis of the agreements reached. The extent and quality of cooperation are solely determined by the interests of the two countries' industry and research.

FDP Deputy Criticizes Agreements

LD290911 Hamburg DPA in German 0310 GMT 29 Mar 86

[Text] Hannover, 29 Mar (DPA) -- The SDI agreements between Bonn and Washington have been sharply criticized by FDP Deputy Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher. In an interview with the Hannover NEUE PRESSE (Saturday's edition), the politician says: "There is now the danger that the whole difficult disarmament dialogue will be burdened by such agreements as SDI, and that the thaw will return to a new freeze. This is a great danger for world peace.

Mrs Hamm-Bruecher expressed concern that "the secrecy arouses the suspicion that more has been agreed than is being innocently revealed." The signing of the SDI agreements in Washington "means political agreement on the SDI arms program. This, is contrary to the mood in a broad majority of the FDP, at least." Hitherto only "solidarity with the FDP federal chairman, who led the negotiations, prevented me from making our reservations known in the past few days." Whether this solidarity had been worthwhile is uncertain.

An advance edited version of the interview was made available to DPA.

Rau Criticizes FRG Participation

LD272046 Hamburg DPA in German 1802 GMT 27 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 27 Mar (DPA) -- SPD chancellor candidate Johannes Rau has described the Federal Government's decision to sign an agreement on participation in the U.S. SDI program as wrong and unacceptable. Rau said today that German interests are not served by what has been agreed under completely incomprehensible pressure to reach an accord.

German interests would have been served by working toward preventing a new arms race in space, Rau said. "We have enough problems to solve in our world for which high expenditure on research and development would be worthwhile." Most people are of exactly the same opinion, he said; through the agreement economic relations will be placed under a military imperative via the back door. The Federal Government is well aware of why it is being so secretive. This will only increase the uncertainty in German industry.

Bahr Says Accords Not Binding

LD272146 Hamburg DPA in German 2058 GMT 27 Mar 86

[Text] Saarbruecken, 27 Mar (DPA) -- SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr believes that an SPD-led Federal Government would possibly withdraw from the SDI agreements. Bahr said on Saarland Radio this evening that the agreements are only binding on the present Federal Government and not the state of the Federal Republic of Germany, and "of course also not the next Federal Government."

Bahr gave as the reason for his view that the agreements are not binding the fact that because of the confidentiality agreed to by the Federal Government the accord cannot be put before the Bundestag for ratification. The opposition will now press for the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees, meeting confidentially, to be informed of the text of the agreements.

Vogel Discusses SDI in Beijing

LD281014 Hamburg DPA in German 0937 GMT 28 Mar 86

[Text] Beijing, 28 Mar (DPA) -- Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the SPD Bundestag group, sees new burdens in the inner-German relationship and relations with the Soviet Union and the other East European states in the participation by the Federal Republic in the U.S. SDI program agreed upon in Washington on Thursday. Because of the participation in the research program for space weapons, it was also to be feared that the German contribution to the civilian West European technology project, Eureka, would turn out to be only half-hearted, Vogel said in Beijing on Good Friday.

Vogel said during a talk with more than 100 Chinese foreign and security policy experts that "the Federal Government is in the difficult position of wanting to please all of the people all of the time." This has led to an undesirable splitting up of resources.

The Eureka program receives sustained support from Beijing for reasons of political and economic balance. At the invitation of the Society for Foreign Relations, the SPD floor leader earlier outlined his party's views on detente and disarmament in a lecture and noted "many points of agreement" with the Chinese position here. The highlight of Vogel's visit will be a meeting with party chief Hu Yaobang and Politburo member Hu Qili on Saturday.

In the lively discussion after the lecture, in which the Chinese raised the subject of SDI again and again, Vogel expressed the view that the decision by Bonn could further impair the political weight of the Federal Republic in the East-West detente dialogue. "In the SDI issue in particular, the Federal Government has sought closeness to the United States in a manner which arouses the impression that its room for maneuver has become less." There were no indications that the visit by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to the Federal Republic, about which there had been speculation in the press, would take place in the next few months, Vogel said.

FBI Remains 'Obligated'

DN030747 Cologne AED Television Network in German 2000 GMT 2 Apr 86

[Text] [Genscher] It was necessary to ensure that the participation of FBI computers and research institutes in the U.S. SDI research program would be strictly in compliance with the ABM Treaty, which represents an obligation of the two superpowers to limit defensive measures. We will remain obligated to the objective which was laid down by the United States and the USSR on 8 January 1985, namely, to prevent an arms race in space, and to halt it on earth.

[Kuntze] The agreements did not materialize without frictional losses. Was that just clumsy political handling, or was it attributable to different foreign policy concepts?

[Genscher] To begin with it had to be established what could be arranged bilaterally and what could not. Bilaterally, the technological-economic questions can be settled. The strategic issues, the problems pertaining to European security, the cohesion of the alliance, must be discussed within the alliance. This concerns all member states of the Western alliance. Any attempt to settle these matters bilaterally would split the alliance, thus impairing our security.

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Publication of SDI Agreements

LDO41923 Hamburg DPA in German 1821 GMT 4 Apr 86

[Text] Bonn, 4 Apr (DPA) — West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has indicated that the Federal Government would see no problem in publishing Bonn's SDI agreements with the United States. However, the Americans had expressed the desire that they remain secret. Nevertheless, there would be absolutely no problem about the Federal Government informing four Bundestag Committees in detail about the agreements.

Genscher also agrees with a Bundestag debate on SDI, as called for by the SPD. He said in an interview with the BONNER GENERALANZEIGER (Saturday's edition), the text of which was circulated by the Foreign Ministry: "We do not want any secretiveness." Parliament was the place where questions concerning the nation must be discussed.

Genscher also expressed the understanding that German citizens had reacted "more sensitively" to the SDI agreements with the United States than public opinion in Great Britain. The Federal Republic was more involved as a result of the stationing of allied troops and nuclear weapons, and also through its own defense efforts.

Regarding the movement to SPD Government, we must take into account the fact that in the event of an election victory, (the SPD) would withdraw from the NATO, limited, and in fact not even from what has been called withdrawal. It is difficult to see how this could be a SPD research program. It would undermine the fundamental principles of the entire country. However, the SPD recently said it had nothing against firms participating in NATO.

German Position on Security

DEUTSCHE PRESSE UND INFORMATIONEN SERVICE TO LONDON (110) 007 1 Apr 75

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by publisher Rolf Bauer in the "Frankfurter Allgemeine" program in Bonn - (10)]

[Bauer] Minister, time and again SPD circles have said they would cancel agreements and treaties made by the FRG Government once the SPD would hold the reins of government, including those regarding NATO, the NATO dual-track decision, and military integration in NATO. That is what Mr. Laforêt has said. Does that restrict your actions?

[Genscher] It does not restrict the FRG Government. Questions are raised, however, about what the SPD really wants. The demand to leave NATO is particularly serious. It is tantamount to demanding the withdrawal of the allied troops from the FRG - the Americans, the French, the British, the Belgians, and the Dutch. It means we would stand alone. Thus the defense of central Europe would no longer be possible. The comparison to Spain is inappropriate since Spain has no common border with the Warsaw Pact countries.

Of course, the demand to change the NATO dual-track decision to opt to jeopardize the promising negotiations on eliminating both the Soviet and the U.S. medium-range missiles. We want the elimination of both of them, the Soviet missiles, because of which we feared, and, step by step and concurrently, the U.S. ones.

[Bauer] Mr. Minister, there are different opinions in the government coalition concerning NATO and security. You say it has a strictly civilian character, the CDU has a different view. The CDU also has a different position on your appeal to accelerate the Bonn-East Berlin security policy initiatives. Does that not imply irritation?

[Genscher] On 18 December we came to a unanimous cabinet decision stipulating that the superstructure for participation by FRG companies and research institutions in the U.S. IDI program should be improved. Of course that was a civil agreement. At the time we also said that there must be talks in the alliance on the strategic consequences of SDI. That is also correct. Any attempt at arranging such matters bilaterally would split the alliance, thus jeopardizing our security, which is common security, not a bilateral FRG-U.S. one. It is a European-American security. It must be anticipated that all parts of the government coalition adhere to what has been decided and to what the security interest of our country requires of us and our obligations to NATO as a part of European security policy.

1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 26

[illegible]

The following table shows the number of persons employed in the various occupations in the manufacturing industry in the United States, by sex, in 1900.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various positions of the Board of Directors of the City of New York, for the year 1900. The names are arranged in alphabetical order, and are given in full, with their respective addresses.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various positions in the various departments of the Government of the State of New York, for the year 1900.

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FNC PRESS REVIEWS PARTIES' ATTITUDES TOWARD SDI

DN250817 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0615 GMT 24 Mar 86

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Today's topic of discussion is what form German participation in the U.S. SDI project should take.

FRANKFURT ALLEMANNE writes: Even before FNC Economic's Minister Bangemann can sign his name to the two memoranda on participation by FNC companies in SDI research and the general technology transfer in Washington this week, there are quarrels about the interpretation of the agreements. Is it a security policy arrangement, as Defense Minister Waerner and CDU Chairman Strauss view it, or is it just an economic-technological skeleton agreement, as FDP Chairman Bangemann and Foreign Minister Genscher affirm?

In spite of the differences in Bonn it is obvious that it was Kohl's message to Reagan 2 weeks ago that caused the President to spur the U.S. negotiators, who until then had been quibbling. Now there is a compromise: The United States has yielded to Bonn's desire to make a statement of intent regarding technology exchange aside from an SDI agreement. However, they do not fully comprehend the reason it is required for the sake of a coalition in the remote FNC. Bonn will make do with keeping the terms secret, if unwillingly. Nevertheless it will make known the basic elements. The CDU/CSU had to put up with the negotiations having been delayed by the FDP's requirement to veil the SDI core with the cloak of technology.

DER WELT writes: Free Democrats, once again, have caused uneasiness where general rejoicing about what had been achieved within the coalition would have been appropriate. It seems as if it is becoming routine for many FDP tacticians to stage a noisy mini-crisis at the last minute before the conclusion of an important set of agreements. That has been the case with the security acts, with Article 116, and now once again with the two skeleton agreements on FNC-U.S. technology transfer, as well as on German participation in SDI research.

Grand Coalitions and coalition infighting changes hardly anything about the cause itself. An editorial correction now and then, that is all. And it will not be different this week. The decisions have been made. The most essential parts were cleared by two structural rounds last Tuesday and last Friday, before and after Chancellor Kohl met Secretary of Defense Weinberger.

The Bonn ALLEMANNE-ALLEMANNE writes: The ghost of special secret FNC-U.S. agreements that cover important issues of security policy seems to cause quite a bit of con-

fusion, especially among the liberals. In that context the view of CDU Deputy Ruche, who considers the U.S. desire not to publish the agreements reasonable, seems to be more realistic. Nevertheless, both parties must consider carefully how the impression of mystery can be avoided in this bilateral matter, especially in view of the strategic unity of the Atlantic alliance.

The Freiburg BADISCHE ZEITUNG writes: Economics Minister Bangemann's trip to the United States is not only burdened with problems because differences within the coalition on SDI have come to light, but it also suffers from the announcement that the two agreements, on which there is no accord between Bonn and Washington, will be signed before Easter. Hence, Bonn's emissary is in a predicament. He must reconcile what is not agreed upon: The U.S. desire to give the SDI agreement a military character, and Bonn's different intention of keeping it as much as possible within the framework of an economic agreement. Such basically different views between the alliance partners become increasingly critical with the disintegration of consent within the Bonn government. The FDP frankly states that it is concerned about the departure from the governmental guidelines that were agreed upon in December, and within the CDU/CSU, the advocates of the strategic military objectives of SDI are stirring. Considering the situation, it is no wonder that there is a nervous irritability among the coalition partners. It is the result of a compromise of Bonn's own making, which afterward is interpreted by each participant differently. Such a situation, of course, will not strengthen the negotiating position of the FRG economics minister in Washington.

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CSO: 5200/2666

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S VISIT TO TOKYO REPORTED

OW050807 Tokyo KYODO in English 0743 GMT 5 Apr 88

[Text] Tokyo, April 5 KYODO -- U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger Saturday urged Japanese participation in research for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as star wars. He told reporters at the Japan National Press Club that in a 40 minute meeting with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone earlier Saturday he had said Japan's "great technological genius" could contribute much to the SDI, in which the United Kingdom and West Germany are already participants.

Nakasone answers that Japan will study whether or not to participate in research on the space-based antimissile system after hearing the report of a 55-member government and industry delegation now visiting U.S. military and research facilities, scheduled to return to Japan April 10, according to Japanese Government officials.

The issue of SDI is expected to come up both in the meetings of Nakasone and President Ronald Reagan in Camp David and Washington on April 13 and 14, and at the May 4-6 summit of seven industrial nations in Tokyo. Nakasone recently hinted during a debate in the Diet that a response to the U.S. invitation to join in SDI research might come before the Tokyo summit, noting that a year has passed since the U.S. formally asked for Japanese participation.

In the press conference Weinberger praised recent Japanese efforts to smooth the export of military technology to the U.S., which opposition parties have interpreted as contradicting the prohibition of arms exports under Japan's pacifist constitution. The first transfer of an item of Japanese Government-owned military technology to the United States "has recently been virtually approved for transfer to the United States Government," Weinberger said.

"This is the beginning of what I hope will be a heavily traveled two-way street -- (including) dynamic interaction between Japanese and U.S. industries, exchanging military and dual-use technologies for their own competitive interests and in the interests of mutual national security," Weinberger said.

Companies in Japan and other industrial nations have expressed great interest in the commercial possibilities of SDI research. Among the 21 Japanese companies in the SDI delegation now visiting the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Hughes Aircraft Company and other U.S. private and public facilities are representatives of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD., and Fujitsu, Hitachi, and Nissan Motor Co.

Weinberger also said Japan, the U.S., and Europe should not underestimate the Soviet Military buildup in Asia, saying that the Soviet Union has "recently deployed atomic cannons" to Sakhalin Island, north of Japan's northernmost island of Hokkaido. In a speech contrasting what he called the success of "democracy and free enterprise" in the fast-growing economies of many Asian nations with the Soviet "forces of despotism." Weinberger reasserted the need for trust between Japan and the U.S.

He said in this context that he was "confident" bilateral trade differences could be managed. Weinberger praised Japan's efforts to strengthen its military, noting that Japan's defense budget has been growing in the face of severe fiscal belt-tightening. Last year Japan raised its defense budget 6.8 percent to 3.34 trillion yen, more than any other area of government spending.

The issue is sensitive in Japan, where the post-World War II constitution designed by U.S. occupation authorities prohibits the maintenance of military forces, although the present Japanese forces, called the Self-Defense Forces, number about 250,000, and about 47,000 American troops are stationed in the archipelago.

Weinberger arrived in Japan April 4 from South Korea as part of an Asian tour. He is due to arrive in the Philippines April 6 and will also visit Thailand and Australia.

/6091

CSO: 5260/073

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

TASS CITES JAPANESE SCIENTISTS—Tokyo March 23 TASS—The Japanese Congress of Scientists has rejected any possibility of its cooperation in implementing the American "star wars" plans. Their statement, distributed here, stressed that the so-called Strategic Defence Initiative was openly directed at kindling a global conflict on earth and in outer space. The Japanese Congress of Scientists declared that its members would not render any assistance to the development of systems and armaments necessary for the realization of the White House's plans. The congress resolutely denounced the stance of the Nakasone cabinet which was seeking to involve the country into the suicidal preparation of "star wars." [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0716 GMT 23 Mar 86] /8309

SPAIN'S GONZALEZ VIEWS SDI—In the inaugural broadcast of the new Madrid Radio International Service program "Morning America," Prime Minister Gonzalez has described as interference in Spanish foreign policy the threats by Al-Qadhdhafi against U.S. bases in Spain. With regard to "star wars" and its possible contribution to international security, Gonzalez said he is in favor of negotiations leading to the disappearance of nuclear weapons as, in his opinion, SDI is currently provoking risks and tensions. [Text] [Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1700 GMT 1 Apr 86 LD] /6091

FRG'S BANGEMANN LEAVES FOR WASHINGTON SDI TALKS—Frankfurt, 24 Mar (DPA)—Federal Economic Minister Martin Bangemann (FDP) today left for Washington where he is to conduct final negotiations on German-U.S. cooperation in the development of a space defense system (SDI). The negotiations will end with the signing of an agreement on SDI and technology transfer in connection with the developments in this system. [Text] LD241554 Hamburg DPA in German 1353 GMT 24 Mar 86] /9274

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: EDITORIAL ON REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT, SOVIET PROPOSALS

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan 86 pp 3-10

[Text]

To get a true perception of the import of an international event one must see not only its essence but also the place which this event occupies in the unfolding historical process.

When Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, the leaders of the USSR and the USA, met in Geneva, from November 19 to 21, a vigorous attempt was made to put an end to the chill that hampered Soviet-American relations and the world situation as a whole over the recent years. The two great powers went through a difficult period of heightened tension, intensified war threat, and a weakening of the foundations of normal cooperation among states. American imperialism, which channeled the events in this direction, was intent on testing its strength against existing socialism, continuing the arms race, and pushing the world to the fatal brink.

The Soviet Union together with the other socialist countries, while not rejecting the challenge, constantly—in word and deed—offered the prospect of progress along a different path: toward lesser tension, limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, and prevention of the militarisation of outer space.

The USSR took major unilateral steps aimed at strengthening peace and effecting real disarmament measures. These, above all, are the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the proposal to freeze nuclear arsenals, the introduction of a moratorium on the orbiting of antisatellite systems, the suspension of countermeasures in Europe to the deployment of American missiles, and, later, shortly before the meeting, the removal from combat alert in the European zone of medium-range missiles additionally emplaced there. And, lastly, the Soviet Union's declaration of the moratorium on all nuclear explosions as a weighty measure that was vigorously supported on every continent. A positive response was also generated by the proposals to improve the situation in Europe and the rest of the world, which were jointly advanced in this period by the Warsaw Treaty member states.

The consistently peaceable foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole is a vital factor influencing world developments, which Washington ultimately had to reckon with, all the more so since the dangerous adventurism in US policy had long evoked concern everywhere in the world. Even among US allies confusion had arisen, which greatly intensified after the American Administration declared its plans to prepare for "star wars".

Under these circumstances the American Administration was forced to manoeuvre and make adjustments in their propaganda line, in which irreconcilability began to run parallel with ostensible peaceability.

Such was the situation at the moment when a joint accord was reached in January 1985 which made it possible to start new Soviet-American talks on the whole range of nuclear and space weapons. Strict compliance with this accord would create the prerequisites for palpable progress in preventing the arms race in outer space and halting it on the Earth, strengthening strategic stability, eliminating the nuclear war threat and, ultimately, doing away with nuclear weapons.

It is on this basis and in development of this accord that the USSR advanced specific and radical proposals to reduce, given a complete ban on attack space armaments, 50 per cent of the USSR's and the USA's nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory. The aggregate number of charges for each of the sides would be limited to a ceiling of 6,000 units, which would mean a reduction of thousands of nuclear charges. The USSR views such a reduction only as the beginning of the road to the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

Considering the fact that the USA and its allies are not prepared to rid Europe of nuclear weapons completely, as the Soviet Union has proposed, the USSR voiced a readiness to start with at least an intermediate step, and subsequently to work for further reductions.

To break up the vicious circle of the arms race and prevent a new, unpredictably dangerous spurt of the arms race in space—this is the principal motive behind the USSR's constructive approach to relations with the United States. The Soviet Union does not at all view the world through the prism of how relations shape up between the USSR and the USA. The opposite is more likely the case: the priority problems for any state, be it large or small, which are being experienced by the world at this historical stage prompt the two countries and their leaders to display greater responsibility in relations between them.

Guided by this great responsibility to its own people and to the peoples of other countries, the Soviet leadership adopted a decision to consent to a meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan.

Clearly, the behaviour of the American side, both at the talks, where it evaded the elaboration of mutually acceptable accords, and outside their framework, as well as the stepped up across-the-board US military preparations, left no room for illusions. The USSR well understood the class essence of the policy that stands opposed to it, and had precisely weighed the parameters of the objectively existing spheres of concord.

The USSR also took into consideration the fact that the idea of holding a productive summit had from the outset come up against the opposition of influential right-wing conservative circles in the USA, above all of those who draw profit from the arms race and for whom greed overshadows reason in these matters. It is no secret that there are many forces in the USA that are altogether against the development of any contacts with the Soviet Union. It is they who advised the President either to decline a meeting with the Soviet leader, all the more so to speak with him tête-à-tête, or to reduce the entire meeting to diplomatic niceties on the summit level.

Indicatively, on the eve of the meeting the Heritage Foundation, a prominent American conservative organisation, issued a special memorandum to the US President in which he was advised to hold a "tough" meeting and confine himself solely to setting forth American "claims", accusing the USSR of allegedly building up armaments over and above its defence needs, interfering in different regions of the world, oppressing dissidents at home, and so on.

The conservatives directly cautioned the US President against any accord in the arms limitation sphere. Even if an agreement were to be attained only in principle, the memorandum read, this would create a problem, inasmuch as the American public, the Congress and the allies would in this instance pressure the US Administration into finalising such an agreement. And this does not mesh with the political thinking of the US military-industrial complex.

Concern over the possibility that an accord would be reached was likewise manifest in the "revelation" just before the President's plane left for Geneva of a secret letter of US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, which he attached to the latest Pentagon report on the so-called "Soviet violation" of arms limitation agreements and on US "countermeasures" for a further arms buildup in this connection.

In the letter, which was supposedly inadvertently leaked to the press, Weinberger directly urged the President at the Geneva meeting, first of all, not to agree to continue observing the principal provisions of SALT-2, and secondly, not to agree, under any circumstances, to limit the American SDI programme. "The Soviets", the letter read, "doubtlessly, will seek assurances that you will continue to be bound to such tight limits [under the ABM Treaty—Ed.] on SDI development and testing that would discourage the Congress from making any but token appropriations."

One could not help being put on one's guard by the fact that the USA's practical line on the threshold of the meeting corresponded more to precisely these recommendations rather than to the Administration's assurances of a readiness to provide the prerequisites for a productive dialogue in Geneva. Unfortunately, the Administration did not respond to any of the USSR's practical unilateral steps. The USA did not follow the good example set by Soviet Union, although it was precisely this that was expected of them by the peoples of the world and the governments of many countries.

Furthermore, at the stage of the preparations for the summit the American Administration attempted to divert attention, from the need to limit the arms race, and to replace it with the problem of regional conflicts. Here the situation in the countries fighting for freedom and independence was crudely distorted. The policy of direct US interference in the affairs of sovereign states and aid to the forces of counter-revolution were portrayed as supposedly "friendly assistance" to the peoples of these countries.

Lastly, on the very eve of the meeting the American counterproposals on arms reduction issues were advanced. What can be said of them? Outwardly, one's impression might be that the USA was willing to meet the Soviet Union halfway in some respects. For example, they also mention a 50-per cent reduction of nuclear weapons and a ceiling of 6,000 nuclear charges. However, the actual meaning of the American proposal was different.

Let us take strategic armaments. The American side spoke about their reduction. Yet a careful analysis of the essence of the American proposals will show that, were they to be implemented, the USA would bolster its arsenal by 150 per cent over the very level America itself proposed. Several thousand nuclear warheads—long-range sea-based cruise missiles, air bombs and shells—would remain outside the framework of the limitations. Nor did the American proposals include the many hundreds of US forward-based nuclear weapons deployed on aircraft carriers and at the numerous bases around the Soviet Union.

Nor did the US proposals offer a solution to the problem of medium-range weapons in Europe. As in the past, they left the nuclear weapons of Britain and France out of the reckoning. After all, the more than 500 warheads of the British and French missiles targeted at the USSR and its allies form a considerable part of the West's nuclear potential. And the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe (in keeping with

the US proposals) would continue for that matter. By establishing a limit on such a deployment in the number of launchers, the USA arrogates itself the right to replace certain types of these launchers with others. As a result, the overall number of American missiles in Europe and warheads could more than double.

In short, these were partial and to a great extent unfair proposals.

However, the fact that the sides were going to the Geneva talks with clearly different aims and proposals did not shake the USSR's confidence that the meeting was essential after seven years of crisis development. The relations between the two most powerful countries of the world were at too low a level, and the arms race had spiralled too high. An open, frank discussion at the top level and a profound comparison of the actual stands of the sides had long become imminent. To postpone such a talk would mean risking holding a Soviet-American dialogue when it was already too late.

The Soviet side went to the meeting convinced that the difference in ideologies and socio-economic and political systems is not an insurmountable barrier to a way out of the present situation, and that there are no contradictions fatally dooming the USSR and the USA to confrontation, all the more so to war. To rectify the situation, as was repeatedly stressed by the Soviet side, political will is required, and the Soviet leadership has always had it. It is imperative that the USA in its practical policies harbour no illusions about the possibility of shooting ahead in the arms race and acquiring military superiority, that it not hold to the hypertrophied concept of its "vital interests" on the international scene, but take stock of present-day realities and of the changes that have taken place in the world over the past few decades. In his report at the latest session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev formulated the Soviet Union's stand in an extremely clear-cut manner: "The crucial times we are living through leave the leaders of the USSR and the USA, the peoples of the USSR and USA no other alternative than to learn the great art of living together."

The attitude of the Soviet side to the meeting was determined above all by the principle that in preparing for and holding it both sides' attention should be focused on the problems that determine Soviet-American relations and the state of affairs on the international scene as a whole—questions of security, the centerpiece of which is the problem of nuclear and space weapons in their interconnection.

The Soviet Union had a clear-cut concept of this meeting, which was organically based on the USSR's principled and consistent approach to relations with the USA and which creatively took into account the characteristic features of the moment. The USSR, specifically, took a sober view of the actual situation and did not harbour the slightest illusions about American policy. The Soviet side saw how far the militarisation of the economy and even of political thinking in the USA had gone. Yet Moscow realised full well that the situation in the world is far too dangerous to ignore even the slightest chance to rectify the situation and advance to a more stable and lasting peace.

Having just as vested an interest in the success of the Geneva summit as the USA, the Soviet leadership nevertheless realised far more clearly the two countries' joint responsibility for the future of the world. And when they paved the way and created a favourable climate for it, they were guided by simple logic: the political atmosphere of talks is formed well in advance. "We considered it necessary," Mikhail Gorbachev noted, "to try to break the dangerous course of events by force of argument, by force of example, by force of common sense."

During the meeting a far-reaching exchange of views was held on the main issues of Soviet-American relations and the present-day international situation, in which the Soviet side highlighted the vital problems of security.

Of great importance in this connection was the fact that lengthy private talks were held with the US President at the summit. This made it possible to discuss even the most difficult problems in a totally candid and direct manner, and to have a first-hand knowledge of each other's stand.

The keynote of the Soviet stand was the need to drastically change the present course of Soviet-American relations on the basis of the only possible understanding of the fact that there is no reasonable alternative to peaceful coexistence between the USSR and the USA. The Soviet side stressed that the cardinal changes that have taken place in the world of late require a new approach, a fresh perception of many foreign policy issues.

At the Geneva summit the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the US President discussed in detail aspects of the talks on nuclear and space weapons. It was firmly stated to the President that the main thing in these questions is to prevent the penetration of weapons into outer space, and that on this depends whether it will be possible to reduce the corresponding nuclear weapons of the USSR and the USA first by 50 per cent, as the Soviet side proposes, and then, with the involvement of the other nuclear powers, to eliminate them altogether.

The idea was expressed to the President that if it is difficult for both sides today to initiate a productive dialogue and talks on halting the arms race and on nuclear disarmament, tomorrow this will be even more difficult. Indeed, were the arms race to be spilled into outer space with new types of nuclear weapons being created, it would become uncontrollable and to a certain extent irreversible.

By filling outer space with highly sophisticated types of weaponry, mankind could find itself under the power of computers, when the slightest breakdown in the warning systems or any other accident would pose a real threat of plunging the world into a catastrophe, even contrary to the will of political leaders. One cannot farm out to technology the adoption of vital decisions in the security sphere.

In connection with the fact that during the meeting the US President tried to uphold his favourite brainchild, the "strategic defense initiative" and to give it an all but humane aspect, the Soviet side showed in a well-argued manner that the American programme announced in 1983 is nothing but a departure from the valid ABM Treaty of unlimited duration. The programme is aimed at the development of a new class of armaments—attack space weapons, with which the USA hopes, in combination with its offensive nuclear arms, to acquire the capacity to deliver a first nuclear strike with impunity. Furthermore, the "space shield" created in this fashion could, when necessary, fulfil the functions of offensive weapons and become an inalienable element of an aggression strategy.

Today the propaganda machinery of the US Administration is constantly pushing the idea that if space weapons appear on the American side it will never use them for an attack and will supposedly even be ready to "share" the appropriate technology with the Soviet Union. It is hard to say what is greater here—open cynicism or a desire to boggle the minds of naive simpletons.

Obviously, if there is no intention to use space weapons to the detriment of another side, they should not be made altogether. Besides no one can count on oral assurances in vital issues of security.

It is also well known that the USA is coming forth with a host of speculations around the problems of control, the Soviet stand on this score being purposely distorted. At the press conference in Geneva Mikhail Gorbachev stated in this connection that the truth is that the Soviet Union is open for control. The USA proposes to open laboratories and control how the arms race is proceeding in space, but this is a faulty and unacceptable starting point. If an accord is reached on a ban on the orbiting of weapons in space,

the Soviet leader stressed, the Soviet side will be prepared on a mutual basis to open laboratories to monitor such an accord. If the American Administration follows the Soviet example and halts all nuclear tests and if an agreement is concluded to the effect, then again, as far as the Soviet side is concerned, there will be no problems with control, including international control.

Unfortunately, the US President, judging by the results of the discussion, continues to feel tempted to obtain some unilateral advantage through outer space. Nevertheless, it is important that he once again heard—now at the summit level—the clear-cut view of the Soviet side on the situation that will emerge if the USA remains adamant in seeking to create space-based weapons. It was underscored that the USA will not be able to shoot ahead in this sphere. The Soviet Union is not intent on military superiority itself, but it will not allow such superiority over itself either. To overestimate the possibilities of the USA to dash ahead in the attack space weapons race and to underestimate the USSR's capacity to find a fitting response would be a serious mistake. Such a response—a rather quick and perhaps less expensive one—would be given. However, this would not be of the Soviet Union's choosing.

Yes, we are realists and must state plainly that through the fault of the American side, which literally held tight to its "star wars" plans, no solutions to the central issues of arms limitation and reduction were found at the meeting.

However, the Geneva summit has produced positive results which had largely and unconditionally been promoted by the constructive and consistent policy of the Soviet Union. It is important that in the joint statement the American side confirmed the accord reached in January 1985 between the USSR Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State on the subject and aims of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons. Today, at the highest, presidential, level the USA has pledged to hold talks in keeping with this accord to elaborate measures aimed at preventing the arms race in outer space and halting it on the Earth, to limit and reduce nuclear armaments, and strengthen strategic stability.

Politically, this objectively makes the "star wars" plans more vulnerable and obliges their initiators to weigh once again and adjust their approach to nuclear and space weapons talks, which the sides agreed to speed up. The profound differences notwithstanding, the proposals both sides advanced at the talks also have common ground and provide a certain opportunity for exploring mutually acceptable solutions for a radical reduction of nuclear armaments provided there is a ban on the development of attack space weapons.

An important result of principle of the summit in this respect is the fact that the joint document which was drawn up formalised a mutual understanding that nuclear war should never be unleashed and that there can be no victors in it, the commitment of the two countries to structure their relations taking into account this indisputable truth and not seeking military superiority. The USSR proceeds from the conviction that this understanding, stated jointly and at the top level, should be the foundation of the two states' foreign policies.

Another positive fact in terms of further steps in the sphere of strengthening security is that in the final document of the meeting the USA conjointly with the Soviet Union confirmed their obligation to promote an all-round consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, advocated a general and complete prohibition and non-proliferation of chemical weapons, and progress at the Vienna talks and the Stockholm Conference.

This is definitely a big plus in favour of a positive change in the political and psychological climate in international relations, of their improvement,

and of a reduction of the threat of an outbreak of nuclear war, a reduction so imperative for the attainment of practical agreements.

Aside from an in-depth examination of security problems, the meeting featured a discussion of principle on regional problems, during which the Soviet side firmly rejected the American concept of regional conflicts and underscored the necessity to respect the sovereign rights of states and to let them choose their own path and their own friends without interference in their internal affairs.

The matter here is hardly a desire to exert "pressure" on the United States. Simply, the objective reality of the present-day interdependent world is such that there are simultaneously acting in it the interests of a wealth of diverse states, dissimilar in their social nature, historical experience and foreign policy priorities. These interests sometimes collide, and even lead to military conflicts. These conflicts can be called "regional" only arbitrarily, what with the danger of their spreading in this nuclear age being extremely great.

The Soviet Union is decidedly in favour of a settlement of these conflicts, immediately where this is possible, and gradually in other instances. Only, it should be understood—and the Soviet leader brought this point home to the American side in Geneva—that they will not be "settled" by one state dictating its writ to others. Such a course leads to confrontation, just as does the line for export of counter-revolution—whether in Central America, in the south of Africa, or in the Middle East.

The firm opposition of the USSR to all manifestations of diktat in international affairs, and its invariable solidarity with the peoples struggling for the right to map out their future independently are also a fundamental reality of present-day Soviet-American relations.

A fruitful exchange of views and new concrete ideas took place at the summit on aspects of bilateral cooperation. In confirmation of a certain progress attained in this sphere of late concrete agreements were signed on contacts and exchanges in science, education and culture, and both leaders spoke in favour of the practical development of international cooperation in peaceful utilisation of thermonuclear synthesis. The development of equitable mutually beneficial businesslike cooperation would lay a good material foundation for greater trust and mutual understanding.

In summing up the results of the top-level dialogue it is essential to single out the following. The Geneva summit was a foremost political event in international affairs. Its staging itself is a stabilising factor in the current situation. It was needed to halt the continued worsening of Soviet-American relations and the dangerous escalation of world tensions.

This evaluation is shared by our allies, the fraternal socialist countries, which is borne out with utmost clarity by a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty member countries in Prague immediately upon the completion of the Soviet-American summit talks.

It can be stated that the USSR's concept of Soviet-American relations, which combines adherence to lofty principles in formulating and implementing basic goals, realism in assessing the situation, consistency in pursuing the active policy of peaceful coexistence and in searching for solutions to thorny problems proved to be the working concept.

The results of the summit once again convincingly confirmed the veracity of the fundamental foreign policy aims advanced by the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as the specific initiatives and actions of the Soviet state being effected of late and aimed at the solution of the key issues of the current, extremely crucial period in international development, at the elimination of the protracted dangerous tensions plaguing the world.

The long-term impact of the Geneva summit will, of course, be measured in specific, practical actions and will hinge on the sides' readiness to act on the basis of the joint statement taken in Geneva. The Soviet Union, as indicated by the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, which considered and endorsed the work done by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the meeting with the US President, will do everything necessary to improve Soviet-American relations for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries and in the interests of strengthening universal peace and the development of broad cooperation among countries and peoples. One can only hope that the elements of realism in US policy that manifested themselves during the preparations for and actual holding of the meeting will become manifest in the concrete policies of Washington and that the latter will have sufficient political will to work for the start of a new, more constructive and fruitful period in Soviet-American relations.

"Of course," stressed Mikhail Gorbachev "the real significance of all useful things agreed upon in Geneva can only manifest itself in practical deeds. In this context I would like to state that the Soviet Union for its part intends not to slow down the pace and to work most resolutely and in the spirit of honest cooperation with the United States for the resolution of the acute race and the overall improvement of the international situation. We hope that the USA will display similar approach. Then, I am certain, the work done in Geneva will bring tangible results."

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CSO: 5200/1337

FRANCE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS: GENERAL DISCUSSIONS

FRANCE: Paris 15 (1988) to France 20 (1988) p. 1

Article by French General Division: "Eliminating Nuclear Weapons"

[Text] Eliminating nuclear weapons between one and the other 1988 is a "good idea," President Reagan replied to Mikhail G. Gorbachev's proposal on 15 January.

Can this good idea really lead to reductions in stocks of nuclear weapons or is it merely propaganda for internal consumption on both sides? It is difficult to adopt a stance to simply looking at the future of the weapons side to the two permanent superpowers. The most probable line is the two superpowers' long-term interests. Nations are generally skeptical of the Americans and Soviets cannot be blamed for thinking of themselves first.

For the Americans it is clear that conventional strategic weapons represent the major military danger. They have that there is absolutely no chance of seeing the Soviets landing near Berlin or San Francisco. These weapons are therefore the only ones which directly threaten the U.S. population.

Consequences for Europe

The USSR, a continental power in direct contact with the European states of the Atlantic Alliance, seems to be in a very different situation. In fact this is not the case. Soviet nuclear weapons are also the main danger for the Soviets since they are well aware that the Western superpowers have neither the means nor the will to impact Eastern Europe "in force."

Only strategic nuclear weapons are a direct threat to the Americans and the Soviets. So is it any surprise that they are both trying to get rid of them? Is it any surprise that for 20 years the Soviets have been working to develop and put into service increasingly sophisticated ICBM defense systems? Is it any surprise that since 1981, under the guidance of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) the Americans have been trying to catch up? And is it also any surprise that both are engaged in a continuous reduction in offensive nuclear weapons which could enable them to reduce the cost of the defense system to be reduced?

will also contribute to an American withdrawal from Europe. It will facilitate the famous "unlinking" of the two sides of the Atlantic. Some people will regret this, and this is natural. But it is completely futile to merely lament the fact. There is absolutely no point in leveling accusations at the Americans. It is much better to look at the facts as they are and take advantage of them to finally understand that Western Europe's defense depends primarily on the West Europeans. Fortunately we have all the necessary means for protecting ourselves if we want to effectively adapt our structures to the current dangers rather than to those which existed in the last war. We just have to give the matter sincere thought. And then we must act, in a practical way.

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USSR: 5200/2065

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRANCE'S LE MONDE ASSESSES GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

PM021501 Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Apr 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Megaphone Diplomacy"]

[Text] This Easter weekend will probably have to be classed among the many Soviet "peace initiatives" which have produced no results. When he made his solemn appeal on television on Saturday evening, did Mr Gorbachev believe it would be heeded in the United States? The Soviet leader certainly has no doubts that he made a great effort in refraining from any nuclear tests for 8 months. But he is intelligent enough and well enough informed to know that this final appeal to President Reagan stood no chance of being heeded. Had not the United States carried out an underground test a little over a week ago before the Soviet moratorium even expired? Is he unaware of the fact that these tests are now regarded as particularly necessary to enable American technicians to test elements of a future space shield proposed by President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative?

The fact remains that the Soviet leader knows the virtues of megaphone diplomacy and of sound propaganda and that he has probably scored the points he wanted to score. At a time when the White House incumbent is making an increasing number of warlike gestures toward Nicaragua and Libya, when rumors of possible supplies of new American weapons to the Angolan and Afghan guerrillas make an escalation in these conflicts seem likely, and when Washington is no longer afraid of forgetting the "spirit of Geneva" by goading the Soviet bear in various ways, Mr Gorbachev will eventually be seen as a tireless "peace campaigner" who talks only of "disarmament and dialogue" to closed doors.

It is true that we are not witnessing any special mobilization of the pacifist movement in the world like what happened in Europe during the Euro-missiles crisis. But this situation may only be temporary. And there is reason to wonder whether Mr Reagan's intransigence would not have been more effective a few years ago when Mr Gromyko was saying "no" to everything and when Soviet diplomacy stayed shut away in its "bunker."

At any rate, East-West dialogue will not benefit from this latest incident. The main thing Mr Reagan will remember from it will probably be the additional doubt Mr Gorbachev cast over the holding of the new Soviet-American

summit this summer which is in theory due to be held in the United States. In fact the question is no longer of particular importance, since it is difficult to see what the two superpowers would have to say that was positive at present, be it in London, Geneva, or Washington.

In the short term the Soviet military will be able to resume their nuclear tests soon, and this is possibly the thing they were asking of the general secretary most urgently. Using an expression which is relatively unusual in Soviet language, and which in any case was not used in Brezhnev's time, Mr Gorbachev recently stated that at the present time no state can guarantee its security by arms alone, but only by dialogue and political means. His opponents will now be in a better position to say that it is time to return to the good old methods of a stronger defense and of what is called in Moscow "the improvement of the balance of forces."

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CSO: 5200/2665

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG SPD'S BAHR ON U.S. NUCLEAR TEST, EAST-WEST TIES

LD231531 Hamburg DPA in German 1224 GMT 23 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 23 Mar -- SPD executive committee member Egon Bahr in Bonn today said the setback to East-West relations caused by the latest U.S. nuclear test is incalculable. The Soviet Union's unilateral concession not to conduct nuclear tests as long as the United States did not had not been honored. The conditions set by U.S. President Reagan mean that the United States would only be prepared to stop nuclear tests after the introduction of space weapons. Addressing the Federal Government, Bahr said: "Those about to take part in the research on space weapons have lost their innocence of being against nuclear tests."

The SPD Bundestag group representative for disarmament and arms control, Hermann Scheer, called the U.S. nuclear test a "provocation of world public opinion."

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CSO: 5200/2667

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG SPD, GREENS ON REJECTION OF GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS

LD311438 Hamburg DPA in German 1335 GMT 31 Mar 86

[Text] Bonn, 31 Mar (DPA) -- The SPD and the Greens have criticized U.S. President Reagan's rejection of the Soviet proposals for a far-reaching halt to nuclear tests and an early summit meeting. SPD executive committee member Egon Bahr said on Monday that the speed with which Reagan had rejected the Gorbachev proposals was frightening. Once more no consultations had taken place with the allies concerning the attempt to halt a renewed return to the arms spiral. Bahr accused the Federal Government of shirking the issue to demand from the United States a comprehensive test ban agreement.

Ludger Volmer, lower house group spokesman of the Greens, said that the rejection of the Gorbachev proposals by Reagan proved that the United States is not interested in arms control and disarmament. It shows that the United States intends to pursue its interests in the future through "arms-bristling superpower politics against the rest of the world."

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CSO: 5200/2667

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG PRESS COMMENTS ON GORBACHEV SUMMIT PROPOSAL

DW020854 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 1 Apr 86

[From Press Review]

[Text] One of today's editorial topics is the new Gorbachev initiative for U.S.-Soviet talks on a nuclear test ban.

DIE WELI writes: The motive for that maneuver is becoming very clear. In the near future Gorbachev will end the test ban moratorium that he himself had suggested, because in the long run the Soviets will need such tests just as much as the Americans. The difference is that each of these Soviet subterranean test explosions will be presented to the public as though it had been triggered by the Americans. Washington will have to think of ways of counteracting the Kremlin's propaganda traps more cleverly than it has done in the past few months, the newspaper writes.

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU makes this comment: The Gorbachev proposal is hardly more than an extremely skillful propaganda maneuver by the Kremlin. A meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Europe that might come to naught, could be more easily justified by the Kremlin boss at home, and especially to the powerful Soviet marshals, than an official visit to Washington which would yield hardly more than an intensive tourist program. If the meeting turned out to be fruitless, and that is more likely in view of the stubborn refusal of the United States to join the Soviet moratorium, Gorbachev could hold the United States responsible for the continuing arms race. Even now Washington is on the defensive, the newspaper argues.

AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE writes: Kremlin chief Gorbachev, always endeavoring to represent himself in the West as the true preserver of peace, makes the best of favorable circumstances. With his proposal for a special summit, which Reagan rejected too hastily and with weak arguments, Gorbachev pulled off a new propaganda coup. Washington, however, more and more gets to play second fiddle politically by its continuing to respond to all Moscow proposals with a cool no. If the Americans suspect Gorbachev of just playing a clever propaganda game, why, then, do they not play the same game and take the Kremlin chief at his word? The United States would win credibility if it would test Gorbachev for a change and not just react negatively, the newspaper concludes.

Bonn's GENERAL-ANZEIGER writes: Gorbachev has not yet given a concrete answer to the question whether and when he and Reagan will climb the new summit agreed upon in Geneva in November. That would be the best opportunity for dealing with a broad spectrum of questions and problems pending between the superpowers and not just the partial

aspect of nuclear tests. If Gorbachev were truly interested in an understanding and not just in propaganda tricks he would convey his proposals to Washington via diplomatic channels and not -- as U.S. Secretary of State Shultz justly criticized -- via the media. As long as the Kremlin boss merely pursues first place in the political hit parade on the East-West stage, chances for a fruitful summit meeting are poor, the newspaper states.

NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG notes: Even Gorbachev knows that such meetings, as desirable as they are, cannot be arranged by a new form of television diplomacy. They need careful internal preparations. The subject is too complicated, the political, and arms-technical ramifications are too great, to find solutions at a quick meeting between the two most powerful men in the world in no time, as it were. Therefore the Kremlin chief has made it easier for the Americans to react negatively to his proposals. It cannot be ruled out that he wanted to provoke Washington to saying no in order to be able to pass the buck to the Americans when the Soviets resume their own nuclear tests. For that reason Washington's hasty rejection was unwise, the newspaper underlines.

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CSO: 5200/2667

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET STATUTE ON EXPORT OF CHEMICALS

Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 3, Mar 86 p 160

[Statute, dated 23 January 1986, of USSR Council of Ministers on Export of Chemicals]

[Text] On 23 January 1986, the USSR Council of Ministers confirmed the Statute on export of chemicals, which have peaceful uses, but can be used to produce chemical weapons. The text of this document is published below.

Statute on Export of Chemicals Which Have Peaceful Purposes, But Which Can Be Used to Produce Chemical Weapons

The statute regulates the export from the USSR of chemicals of peaceful designation, but which can be used to produce chemical weapons (further designated as dual-purpose chemicals). A list of dual-purpose chemicals is appended.

The indicated list can be changed only by decisions of the USSR Government.

Dual-purpose chemicals can be exported from the USSR with regard to the obligations of the Soviet Union that ensue from its participation in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on prohibition of war-time use of poison, toxic or other similar gases and bacteriological substances.

Dual-purpose chemicals can be exported from the USSR if there are guarantees from the importing countries that chemicals of this category:

a) will not be used directly or indirectly to produce chemical weapons;

b) will be reexported or transferred from the jurisdiction of the recipient country only in the presence of a written agreement to this by the appropriate Soviet foreign trade organization (this agreement can be prohibited in the case of multistage reexport both by the Soviet foreign trade organization directly and through intermediate reexporters).

The indicated obligations should be specially formulated by competent government organizations of the recipient countries in each specific case of shipments of dual-purpose chemicals from the USSR or should be confirmed by reference to

the corresponding obligations with respect to existing multilateral or bilateral pacts, agreements and other legal-contract acts.

Dual-purpose chemicals are exported from the USSR through foreign trade organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Drafts of the agreements (contracts) with foreign contract agents in the part of the guarantee conditions, linked to export of dual-purpose chemicals, are coordinated with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Dual-purpose chemicals can be shipped from the USSR only after the guarantees provided above have been received by the appropriate USSR foreign trade organization from the recipient country.

If the obligations provided by this Statute are violated by the recipient country, export of dual-purpose chemicals from the USSR to this country should be prohibited.

Simultaneously with prohibition of export, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, with the participation of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs if needed, should undertake measures according to the standards of international law and international agreements of the USSR to ensure fulfillment of the adopted obligations by the recipient country.

A decision to renew export is made by the Ministry of Foreign Trade upon coordination with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in each specific case after the reasons for violating the obligations have been determined.

List of Dual-Purpose Chemicals

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Cyanogen chloride | 7. Thioldiglycol |
| 2. Dichloroacetic anhydride | 8. Methylaniline hydrochloride |
| 3. Hydrogen cyanide | 9. Chloroethanol |
| 4. Phosphorus oxychloride | 10. Compounds having a methyl-phosphorus bond |
| 5. Phosphorus trichloride | |
| 6. Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin) | |

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CSO: 5200/1325

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

FRG SPD'S BAHR URGES DEBATE OVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS

EW011255 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 1100 GMT 1 Apr 86

[Report on remarks by SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr; date and place not given]

[Text] SPD disarmament expert Bahr has called on the Federal Government to oppose the production of chemical weapons. The topic is on the agenda of a NATO meeting next month.

[Begin recording] The Federal Government bears primary responsibility for another round of chemical armament. If it says no, there will be no yes from any other European ally. A NATO decision in May would have yet another consequence: For years negotiations have been conducted in Geneva on the worldwide ban of chemical weapons. The Federal Government is a cautiously optimistic about the chances of the negotiations. Experts declare that an agreement could be reached within 2 years, and that the old stockpiles could be destroyed under international control within 10 years.

The new binary weapons have features which have so far made it impossible to control their existence. Anyone beginning to produce them at this time torpedoes Geneva. Hence, it is the Federal Government which virtually decides whether or not the negotiations on the worldwide ban of chemical weapons in Geneva makes sense at all. The U.S. Congress has left the decision up to the Europeans. The Federal Government bears the principal responsibility in that respect. The matter demands public debate, so that the public will not be confronted with faits accomplis by officials who are bound to follow orders. [end recording]

/9274

CSO: 5200/2667

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

FRG DEFENSE MINISTRY SAYS NO BINARY WEAPONS SLATED

DW020738 Mainz Suedwestfunk Television Network in German 1700 GMT 1 Apr 86

[Text] New types of chemical weapons, so-called binary agents, will not be stockpiled at Germersheim. According to the Rhineland-Palatinate Land Government, the Federal Defense Ministry has said that reports stating that such weapons will be shipped to Germersheim are false. The U.S. Government, the ministry said, has declared repeatedly that the binary weapons will not be stockpiled outside the United States. These weapons consist of two components which form a lethal gas only after firing. They are supposed to be available in late 1987.

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CSO: 5200/2667

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

FRG'S GENSCHER CALLS FOR COOPERATION WITH GDR ON CSCE

LD211008 Hamburg DPA in German 0930 GMT 31 Mar 88

[Text] Bonn, 31 Mar (DPA) -- In the view of Federal Foreign Minister Genscher (FDP), the two German states should make a direct contribution to the forthcoming negotiations of the superpowers on disarmament and security.

In an article published by the Foreign Ministry on Sunday, Genscher therefore calls for the closest possible cooperation between the Federal Republic and the GDR in order to undertake joint initiatives toward progress at the third review meeting of the CSCE in Vienna in November. The Federal Government seeks to follow the path outlined in the CSCE Final Act "with the GDR, and not against it."

According to Genscher the chances are today greater than before of removing gradually and totally the medium-range missiles deployed by the two superpowers in Europe. However, there should not be "great security for large states and much insecurity for small states." The total elimination of nuclear weapons could create more stability only if accompanied by the reduction of conventional weapons and the unambiguous ban of chemical weapons. No one has a greater interest than the two German states in ensuring that war, including conventional war, would never again be fought in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/2667

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NEWSMEN CLAIM CIA ESTIMATES OF SOVIET TESTS CONTAIN 'FALSE DATA'

LEAD0042 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 3 Apr 86

[Text] THE NEW YORK TIMES reported on Wednesday that the CIA had changed its estimates of the yield of Soviet nuclear explosions on which the alleged violations of the 1976 threshold test ban treaty had been long based. Our observer Vladimir Kozlov comments:

It's not for the first time that the American allegations against the Soviet Union also regard its observance of arms control treaties appear to be absolutely groundless. The USSR strictly observes all obligations taken. This fully applies to the two treaties on nuclear blasts which were signed by the leaders of the USSR and the United States in the mid-seventies and which were never ratified by the United States.

Here is what Roger Spanel, director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California said in a written testimony to Congress: Based on our assessment of the relationship between yield and estimated magnitude for the Soviet test site and the pattern of Soviet testing, we have concluded that the Soviets appear to be observing a yield limit. Roger Spanel said. Now the CIA itself is compelled to admit that its previous estimates of the yield of Soviet explosions were too high. This means that the accusations against the USSR were based on false data.

It's not difficult to understand what were the reasons for spreading the anti-Soviet allegations which were completely groundless. By doing so, the American policymakers have been thinking for a decade the verification by the United States of the treaties on the limitation of nuclear explosions signed in 1974 and 1976. In fact, there is no precise document regarding the strict control of a nuclear test ban as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. The USSR is open to control.

The Soviet Union has not held a nuclear explosion, either military or peaceful, since 1969. It signed also in 1976 a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and called the United States to join it in a total test ban. The moratorium expired on 23 March, but the Soviet Union will refrain from conducting tests if the United States does the same.

If such a Soviet-American test ban agreement is concluded, all methods of verification will be used to ensure a most reliable control. The USSR is prepared to accept any control procedure, including on-site inspections. The only thing needed now is to solve the issue of Washington's readiness to meet Moscow halfway so as to make possible the most and most important step toward nuclear disarmament.

END

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET OFFICIALS CABLE U.S. OFFICIALS ON TEST BAN

Tolkunov, Voss Cable O'Neill

PM031312 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Apr 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS headline: "Address by Soviet Parliamentarians"]

[Text] Comrades Tolkunov and Voss, chairmen of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet, have sent Thomas O'Neill, speaker of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, a telegram. Despite the clearly expressed will of the peoples and their ardent desire to ensure stable peace on earth, the United States is continuing nuclear tests, says the telegram. This is taking place at a time when the USSR is strictly observing the unilaterally-declared moratorium.

In the interests of curbing the arms race and of disarmament, in the interests of freeing mankind completely from weapons of mass destruction, nuclear tests must be halted. The chairmen of the chambers have called on the speaker to use his high prestige and influence and prompt Congress into doing everything in its power so that the United States of America ends nuclear testing. The situation demands action without delay.

Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet Zhukov, Zagladin, Paton, and Tatarchuk, have addressed an appeal to a number of U.S. senators and congressmen to make their voices heard in defense of our children's future, a future free from the nightmarish threat of a nuclear apocalypse, to induce the U.S. Administration to end nuclear testing.

Wright Receives Message

LD030859 Moscow TASS in English 0845 GMT 3 Apr 86

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS -- Boris Paton, a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has called on James Wright, a member of U.S. Congress, to show his weight to urge the U.S. Administration to end nuclear tests.

"The nuclear test at the proving ground in Nevada", says a telegram sent by the Soviet parliamentarian, "which pointedly ignored the urgent demands of international peace-loving public was conducted at a time when the Soviet Union once again reaffirmed its readiness to contribute to ridding mankind of weapons of mass destruction. We expect that the U.S. Administration's peaceable rhetoric will be followed at last by real steps to end nuclear explosions".

"It is my sincere hope that you will raise your voice in defence of a better future for our children, the future free from the nightmarish threat of nuclear apocalypse".

Zhukov Cables Hatfield

LD040801 Moscow TASS in English 0606 GMT 4 Apr 86

[Text] Moscow April 4 TASS -- Georgiy Zhukov, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has urged U.S. Senator Mark Hatfield to continue to insist that the Reagan administration immediately stop all the nuclear tests and resume talks on a general and complete nuclear weapon test ban.

He wrote in his telegram that he was very much indignant over the provocative actions of the U.S. Administration which, despite numerous appeals of the Soviet Union, other countries and the majority of U.S. congressmen had exploded a nuclear device.

"As members of our parliaments we cannot remain indifferent to the threat of the continuation of nuclear tests and the creation of new ever more destructive types of weapons".

De La Garza Receives Message

LD050715 Moscow TASS in English 0706 GMT 5 Apr 86

[Text] Moscow April 5 TASS -- Nikolay Tatarchuk, a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, has sent a telegram to U.S. Congressman E. De La Garza.

"I cannot but express my indignation over the fact that, while the Soviet Union recently declared readiness not to conduct nuclear testing also after March 31 -- until the first nuclear blast in the United States, the Reagan administration has staged another nuclear explosion at the testing site in Nevada and announced plans for yet another such blast shortly," he wrote. Tatarchuk added: "Such actions by the Reagan administration cannot be summed up as anything other than provocative steps undermining the hopes of all nations for a world without wars and weapons."

"As your colleague," he wrote to De La Garza, "I call on you to use your authority and influence in U.S. Congress to impel the administration immediately to buckle down to accomplishing the task of ending all nuclear explosions as a first step to eliminating nuclear weapons."

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CSO: 5200/1328

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET SCIENTISTS ISSUE STATEMENT ON U.S. NUCLEAR TEST

LD262252 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT 26 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow, March 26 (TASS)—Soviet scientists have responded with anger and indignation to the news that the United States tested a nuclear device at a Nevada testing site on March 22, 1986, says a statement signed by Academician Anatoliy Aleksandrov, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, chairman of the committee of Soviet scientists for peace and against the nuclear threat, and Academician Pyetr Fedoseyev, chairman of the Academic Council on Peace and Disarmament Problems.

The latest explosion was carried out at a time when the Soviet Union has been voluntarily refraining unilaterally from all nuclear explosions for more than seven months. The United States took that step in defiance of the demands of the world public, including the American public, that an end be put to nuclear testing. The White House thus irresponsibly challenged the world community.

The United States openly showed its unwillingness to use the realistic opportunity that had appeared to halt the qualitative escalation of the arms race in its most dangerous area of nuclear weapons.

The Nevada explosion showed the true worth of Washington's protestations of its intention "to rid the world of nuclear weapons" and demonstrated that the U.S. true course consists in the stockpiling and improvement of its offensive nuclear potential. Moreover, the continuation of nuclear explosions is openly linked in the USA to the fulfillment of the "Star Wars" program, to the development of space strike weapons. The U.S. course of seeking military-strategic superiority has been confirmed anew.

Our professional knowledge enables us to foresee the catastrophic consequences of the runaway arms race. We well understand the explosive consequences of the latest reckless step of the U.S. leaders in the military, scientific and technical fields and in world politics.

The Soviet scientists have always stood for an end to nuclear tests and for the prohibition and complete elimination of barbarous nuclear weapons.

We share the conviction, expressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, that mankind can and must enter the next century without nuclear weapons.

The Soviet scientists are joining in the protests of the world public over Washington's latest act of nuclear adventurism. We are convinced that the knowledge of scientists in all countries should serve the goals of construction rather than destruction, the prosperity rather than peril of world civilization.

We demand an immediate end to all nuclear weapon tests and the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and universal prohibition of such tests.

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CSO: 5200/1328

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET CRITICISM OF U.S. TEST BAN REFUSAL CONTINUES

Zhukov Details Protests

PH052000 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 86 First Edition p 4

[Article by Yu. Zhukov, chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace: "Responsibility for the Future; Everything Possible Must Be Done To Prevent Another Round of the Nuclear Arms Race Before It Is Too Late"]

[Text] It is difficult to find words to describe the complex gamut of feelings currently experienced by the tens and hundreds of millions of people who follow the development of the struggle to end the arms race with emotion and hope.

Until quite recently many people in the West were under the spell of a perfidious play, cunningly thought up by the "psychological warfare" specialists, claiming that both "superpowers" -- the USSR and the United States -- bear equal responsibility for the arms race and that therefore this struggle should not be taken too seriously.

However, no matter how hard bourgeois news media try to hush up the constant stream of new Soviet peace initiatives, no matter how they distort our proposals, no matter how hard they try to present white as black and black as white, people everywhere are increasingly ridding themselves of this paralyzing delusion. The same thing has been happening over and over again for many months now. The USSR puts forward clean, precise, simple, generally comprehensible, and entirely feasible proposals; the United States promises to study them and subsequently announces: No, this does not suit us. And the reaction of many millions of people echoes throughout the planet. First, universal interest in the Soviet proposals and hope that at any moment a mutually acceptable solution may be found; bewilderment and disillusionment at Washington's negative reaction, followed by indignation and outrage at this reaction, and, finally, determination to fight against it.

However, even if the pernicious concept of "equal responsibility" still survives here and there in the West, it has currently been dealt a crushing blow by the selfsame leaders who rejected out of hand the new proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee 29 March in his speech on Soviet television.

You will recall, comrades, that the speech was broadcast Saturday night. And it was immediately picked up and reported throughout the world by radio and television stations. The world learned that Moscow had again created a real opportunity for ending the nuclear arms race, which is becoming more and more dangerous.

Despite the fact that the United States responded to the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions with a clearly provocative and defiant nuclear weapon test, Moscow -- even on that occasion -- did not slam the door, although it was clearly being pushed to do so.

"As for our unilateral moratorium," M.S. Gorbachev stated, "I am able to say that it remains in force until 31 March 1986. But even after this date, as we have stated, we will not carry out nuclear explosions provided that the United States acts likewise. We are giving the U.S. Administration another chance to adopt a responsible decision, namely to stop nuclear explosions."

"Otherwise," the Soviet leader went on, "the Soviet Union will resume tests. This must be perfectly clear. We regret this, but we will be forced to act in this way because we cannot sacrifice our own security and the security of our allies."

And to ensure that it does not come to that, M.S. Gorbachev offered on behalf of the Soviet Union to meet with President Reagan in London, Rome, or any other European capital in order to reach agreement on ending nuclear tests.

It was evening in Moscow, while in far-off California, where the U.S. President had gone to spend the Easter vacation at his favorite cowboy ranch, the sun was shining brightly. The President was, of course, briefed on the Soviet leader's proposal without delay. But he was busy thinking about other things. He was preparing his Saturday radio address extolling the U.S. Navy's recent aggression against Libya and threatening Nicaragua. The answer to the new Soviet proposal was given there and then by Donald Regan, the White House chief of staff, who accompanies the President everywhere and hastened to give an interview to U.S., British, and French news agency correspondents just an hour after the Soviet leader's speech. It was a categorical "No."

Please note, that this time the U.S. Administration did not even deem it necessary to promise "to study the Soviet proposal," which it did on previous occasions of this kind. In view of the attractiveness of Moscow's new initiative, which immediately met with approval and support, it was decided to stifle from the outset any rising hopes that an accord might be achieved.

The answer was cynical and defiant: We, Regan declared, will nonetheless test our nuclear weapons; the next explosion is scheduled to be carried out in Nevada in mid-April and we do not intend to postpone it; and we do not want any summit in Europe to discuss ending nuclear weapons tests.

In reacting so defiantly, and I would say recklessly, to the Soviet Union's warning that that it is necessary to act with the utmost responsibility at this crucial moment when the question of whether or not there is to be a new round of the nuclear arms race is being decided, the gentlemen who had gathered in California were guided by a primitive gamble on the mentality of the average American citizen. They still believe that the notorious "position of strength policy," which is capable of evoking another bout of chauvinism among the supporters of the present U.S. Administration and of intimidating its opponents, will also work on a worldwide scale.

What a miscalculation! Even the first reactions to what happened last Saturday and Sunday show that the cynical "No" which rang out from Reagan's ranch is having an effect diametrically opposed to that hoped for by those who authorized Reagan to make that statement. I will not quote them, as PRAVDA readers are already familiar with the sharp disapproval expressed not only by participants in the current spring peace demonstrations which are taking place everywhere but also by prominent politicians in Europe and North America.

"Time does not stand still," our party's general secretary warned in his speech last Saturday when he called on the American people and their government and the peoples and governments of all countries to contribute actively, by means of practical steps, to translating the ban on nuclear explosions into reality, into an inalienable norm of international relations.

Soviet peace champions fully agree with the assessment made of the prevailing situation in that most important speech.

And indeed, no sober-minded person can stand aside from the struggle to ban nuclear tests, which has entered a crucial stage. This is the reason why reports about actions in support of the new Soviet proposals and Soviet people's protests against the U.S. leadership's defiant stance are pouring in in an unprecedented stream at the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace from all our 120 local committees.

Around 40 million young Soviet men and women have already signed a message to the White House headed "It Is Still Not Too Late" in which they demand that the United States join the unilateral moratorium which has been observed by the Soviet Union for the past 8 months.

Cables and letters protesting the U.S. leaders' stubborn refusal to heed this demand have been addressed to Washington in the past few days by collectives of the most varied enterprises and establishments, schools, prominent Soviet scientists, students, workers, kolkhoz members, members of countless international friendship clubs at schools and Young Pioneer centers, and participants in mass demonstrations.

I have just received a report from Yalta, where an international meeting was held under the motto "Let us pool our efforts in the struggle for peace and against the threat of nuclear war." Taking part in it alongside Soviet Peace champions were people who had come to the Crimea from Australia, the FRG, Finland, Hungary, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia. They unanimously decided to send President Reagan a message calling on him to accept the Soviet proposal and to issue instructions to halt the preparations for the new nuclear weapon test.

Similar demands were addressed to him by participants in the Krasnodar Kray peace champions' conference, the collectives of Rostov's Rostselmash and Krasnyy Aksey plants, students at Leningrad, Yerevan, and Azerbaijan universities, Orel Oblast's Pokrovskiy Rayon kolkhoz members, pupils at Vladimir City No. 33 School, workers at the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant, and the collective of the Yakutskoloto production association...I have dozens of such reports here.

There was a telephone call from Riga to say that the VEF plant collective has sent a cable to the White House protesting the provocative underground nuclear explosion

carried out of the post office in Nevada. The mailman brought a copy of a message on the same lines to President Reagan which arrived by airmail from Partizansk city in Northern Italy in the Far East. It is signed by 11,000 of the city's inhabitants. In their letter they ask a direct question:

"Mr. President, why is your administration refusing to give a positive answer to the program for phased nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the militarization of space which was put forward by the USSR 15 January? Even after the tragic destruction of Challenger you declared that work on the Strategic Defense Initiative will go on! We resolutely protest this stance of yours! There is no end to such collective and individual letters. There is one from the Swedish "Polar" sports club, and from Nikolay Iosifovich Wilkov, a machine operator in Tajikistan. And here is a letter from a large group of participants in the "Almaz" International youth peace camp in the Ukrainian city of Kasev. Its authors proclaim emphatically:

"No war! No war with war! No war with nuclear weapons! No war! We call on the U.S. Administration: Stop! The nuclear explosions are destroying the earth, they are covering people's souls."

The U.S. public does not know about the Soviet people's powerful wave of protests. The White House maintains a deathly silence about the mail which is pouring in from Soviet Union.

However, such travels without visas and summer or later our American colleagues will get to know that Soviet people are expressing solidarity with their struggle for banning nuclear tests.

At the beginning of May, Soviet peace champions will organize one more demonstration as part of the traditional 1-week festival to support of European security held annually on the initiative of the GPC. Unquestionably, the slogans of the struggle to ban nuclear tests will occupy a central place at these demonstrations. And even the most skillful masters of the U.S. propaganda service will not be able to suppress information about these events.

V.I. Baranov "Edinost" in London

120411k Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland (000) (007 A Apr 80)

[Commentary by Boris Belitskiy on the "Vostok Radio" program]

[Excerpt] Almost exactly 1 month has elapsed since the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the country's governing party, concluded this congress. Such congresses, according to the party's rules, constitute its top policymaking forum. The main task, of course, in historical terms little more than an election, and not much in the past of events is not day and age that even this brief period has provided striking proof of how consistently the Soviet Union is following the policies formulated at the congress. In its main resolution, the congress unambiguously reaffirmed the defensive nature of the Soviet military doctrine based on the USSR's firm commitment to opposing nuclear war in any form. The main thrust of the Soviet Union's foreign policy in the coming years, the congress declared, should be efforts to ensure the implementation of the program outlined by the party's general secretary on 27 January 1980, for eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

Alan, instead of grasping this excellent opportunity to end all nuclear tests once and for all and thereby take the first real step toward nuclear disarmament Washington is practically seeking excuses to continue escalating the arms race. One such excuse was the flimsy argument about the inadequacy of verification procedures for policing an underground test ban. The Soviet Union has disposed of this argument completely by declaring it would accept any form of verification, including on-site inspection. Even flimsier are recent arguments about the Soviet Union being ahead in nuclear testing, or having violated its treaty undertakings.

As for vague charges about the Soviet Union having possibly violated nuclear test agreements, such as the threshold test ban treaty of 1974, a highly relevant fact on this score has been reported from Washington by the world's major news agencies this week. According to these reports, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Casey, has ordered drastic changes in the way his agency judges the yield of Soviet nuclear weapons tests following determinations that its estimates were too high. According to administration officials cited by THE NEW YORK TIMES, Casey's decision has called into question past administration claims that Soviet tests may have violated the threshold test ban treaty.

It's a pity that practically each of these Washington excuses is dutifully echoed in London. Little wonder that even Denis Healey, a Labour Party leader who can hardly be suspected of any pro-Soviet leanings, this week felt constrained to level strong criticism at the Conservative government's tacit agreement with Washington's refusal to begin a constructive dialogue with a view to achieving a comprehensive test ban.

As the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said the other day, he felt certain that the proper conclusions from this refusal would be drawn by the world public as well as the Soviet Union. It has, he said, become particularly clear who's who in world politics.

World Opinion Supports Ban

LD052234 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 5 Apr 86

[IZVESTIYA Political Observer Stanislav Kondrashov commentary; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A large group of U.S. and Swedish political, trade union and public organizations has appealed to President Reagan and the U.S. Congress to end nuclear tests immediately. Over to IZVESTIYA political observer Stanislav Kondrashov:

[Text] There is no need to say that a week ago, Comrade Gorbachev made an offer to President Reagan to meet without delay in order to discuss the issue of halting nuclear tests. The President answered in the negative, promptly, not pausing to think about it. But the world has fallen to thinking, both about this latest refusal and about the policy of the Washington administration in general, does it really want to halt the nuclear arms race, and ultimately, to eliminate the nuclear weapons? President Reagan says yes, and he was saying that before Geneva, at Geneva and after Geneva likewise. Moreover, not bothering with facts, he attributes the authorship of the very idea of eliminating the nuclear weapons to himself. But the sincerity of his intentions is doubted more and more, even by those who by merit of their convictions believe Washington more than Moscow.

Let us take Chancellor, an old and eminent U.S. television observer. About 3 days ago he noted: Divergence in word and deed is not working in favor of the United States now, since it is precisely the United States that has been mounting up its nuclear armaments at the highest rate for the past 20 years.

Or Egon Bahr, prominent West German Social Democrat. He has made it clear for himself yet another time. I quote -- the United States only says "no" to all attempts to stop the spiralling arms race.

In Japan, the daily TOKYO SHIMBUN, and not only it, condemns the Washington position on the issue of nuclear tests. And finally, one more quotation, quite lengthy but an expressive one, from the London weekly THE OBSERVER. The West would be stunned, THE OBSERVER writes, if Gorbachev were subjected to emotional outbursts which, when it comes to Washington, we regard as normal practice in U.S. foreign policies. If the Soviet Navy took on one of the weaker representatives of the capitalist world, sank ships and downed planes, the British House of Commons and the press would long be shuddering from anger and indignation. A real cause for concern would then arise, THE OBSERVER goes on, that a person who exercises the power he was endowed with in such an offhand way, cannot be entrusted with responsibility for nuclear weapons.

What do all these words mean? That the feeling of common sense and of responsibility is in an increasing way associated in the world with the position of Moscow, and not with that of Washington -- even by those, I repeat, who by merit of their convictions and views rather believe Washington and not the other way round. It is precisely the reason why Washington is nervous and trying to brush off the Soviet peace initiatives as a propaganda war. The extreme right among U.S. politicians literally dream about Moscow slamming the door and thus making their position easier.

The latent shifts in the giant massif which is called the world public opinion do not occur rapidly, and there are no seismographs which could measure their magnitude. One thing is quite clear however: The movement of this massif is observed in the direction of those who display platitudes, wisdom, and self-possession in our dangerous age. And those who display opposite qualities, find it increasingly difficult to obstruct this movement.

Secret Testing Concept Refuted

LD062013 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 6 Apr 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] It is not easy to deal with the United States. The President has a meeting with Katya Lyceva and tells her that he is for peace, that peace is his dream, and that he is ready to do anything to eliminate nuclear weapons. But in order to eliminate them, let us stop nuclear tests, at least, for a start, this is so logical. But they tell us no. And they explain their refusal by saying that they have to catch up with us. But here is a diagram [video shows pie chart with table above it listing numbers of nuclear explosions carried out by the United States, USSR, France, Britain and China and percentages in pie wedges. Caption on diagram gives source as Swedish Defense Institute] If one takes the nuclear tests carried out by all countries as 100 percent, then 51 percent belong to the Americans, more than that of all the others taken together. They also explain their refusal by saying that, you see, the nuclear arsenal must be rechecked regularly to see that it is in combat condition, and has not rusted.

the authors to have been aware of the limitations of the data. The authors also state that the data were not representative of the population as a whole, but that the results were consistent with those of other studies. The authors also state that the data were not representative of the population as a whole, but that the results were consistent with those of other studies.

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Management's role is to ensure that the company has the right mix of resources to support its strategy. This involves identifying the company's strengths and weaknesses, and then developing a plan to address them. Management should also ensure that the company has the right mix of resources to support its strategy. This involves identifying the company's strengths and weaknesses, and then developing a plan to address them.

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1. The authors of the present study did not have a hypothesis regarding the effect of the type of music on the effect of listening to music. However, the authors did expect that the effect of listening to music would be different depending on the type of music. The authors expected that the effect of listening to music would be different depending on the type of music. The authors expected that the effect of listening to music would be different depending on the type of music.

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1. The first step in the process of developing a business plan is to conduct a thorough market research. This involves identifying the target market, understanding their needs and preferences, and analyzing the competitive landscape. Market research can be conducted through various methods, including surveys, interviews, and focus groups. The goal is to gather valuable insights that will inform the business strategy and help identify potential opportunities and challenges.

[Shishlin] You are absolutely right. It is true that the United States would like to create the conditions in various directions under which it would be simply too complicated to achieve sensible compromises because the movement to a sensible compromise can only be bilateral. But I believe that it is worth also mentioning that the Soviet Union has strong nerves, and the strategic line of the Soviet Union to strengthen peace, and to ensure international security is not a fluctuating one but a long-term policy. I do not believe that the Soviet Union will lack self-control, patience, persistence, or goodwill to overcome this cold wind that blows today from Washington.

[Fischer] But will the Soviet Union now slam the door if there is another explosion of a nuclear charge in the United States, despite all the international protests?

[Shishlin] No. The Soviet Union will, of course, keep open the door for negotiations, for dialogue with the United States. I am convinced that there are in the United States political circles that are even further right than the President, even if it is difficult to be further right than Reagan. These circles want the continuation of the nuclear tests in the United States to be the shove that leads to the dialogue between the the USSR and the United States being interrupted for a long time. It seems to me, however, that objectively not only the USSR, but the United States is also interested in continuing the Soviet-American dialogue. I therefore believe that the U.S. nuclear tests and the position now adopted by the administration are not Washington's last word.

[Fischer] The Soviet Union has made it clear that it will have to resume its nuclear tests if the United States, despite all the protests throughout the world, explodes another nuclear charge.

[Shishlin] Well, if the United States continues its series of nuclear tests, the USSR will have no alternative but to resume its tests. What is important however, is above all that the Soviet Union has made its choice for a complete stop to all nuclear tests in the world. We will continue to stick to that.

The resumption of nuclear tests would not mean that this problem would then be pushed to one side. No, the Soviet Union will always return to this problem, because without solving this problem the improvement of the political climate in the world is unthinkable.

[Fischer] In the United States there have been attempts to insinuate that the Soviet Union wanted to replace the visit by Mikhail Gorbachev to the United States agreed on 18 January with its proposal for a special summit on the question of the nuclear test moratorium in Europe. What can one say about that?

[Shishlin] As far as the Soviet-American summit in the United States is concerned, this question remains open. The Soviet Union is interested in this meeting, but the Soviet objective is the solution that it must not be a formal meeting, not a meeting to restore acquaintance, but a meeting to discuss the fundamental problems connected with international security. The result will also depend on how the U.S. position on the moratorium of nuclear testing develops. Such a meeting is necessary.

Sukhin Cites Gorbachev

LD031645 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1552 GMT 3 Apr 86

["Concern Over the State of Soviet-U.S. Relations"--TASS headline]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 3 Apr (TASS) -- The answers of Mikhail Gorbachev CPSU Central Committee General Secretary to the Algerian weekly REVOLUTION AFRICAINE were published today. I would like to draw your attention to some evaluations of the international situation contained in this interview at this meeting, Valeriy Sukhin, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Department said. He spoke today in the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative in particular focused attention on Mikhail Gorbachev's words to the effect that the conclusion between the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear explosions would have an enormous real significance because it would be a barrier to perfecting nuclear weapons and to creating new forms of them.

Although we immediately heard a negative statement in response to the new address by the Soviet leader to the President of the United States, we nevertheless hope that both the President and his immediate circles and the Congress will still consider this proposal.

Hundreds of states and peoples live in the world and want a better life. The leaders of the USSR and the United States bear the responsibility for preserving and strengthening peace not only for their own, but also for all other peoples, Valery Sukhin stressed.

U.S. Breaks Word

LD032253 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 3 Apr 86

[Talk by APN political observer Gennadiy Gerasimov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Hello, comrades. As you know, the treaty on banning nuclear weapons tests on the ground, under water, and in space was signed by the United States.

The treaty was concluded in Moscow in 1963 and its participants expressed the determination, and I quote: to strive to achieve for all time the halting of all nuclear weapon test explosions and to continue talks for this purpose. That was the promise. Yet again the United States gave its word in 1969 when it signed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which reaffirms the promise of 1963.

The value of the word given by the United States and of how much it is worth is in question. One could continue this parade of promises up to the present day. Recently the head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva disarmament conference reiterated ritual. For the United States a ban on tests remains a goal that is due to be achieved at the appropriate time, but he did not specify the time. Twenty-three years have elapsed since the first promise, and 17 years have passed since the second. Moreover, these promises should be regarded as legal commitments. When will this appropriate time be? Is it not receding to infinity?

The White House statement on Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's television speech of 29 March opens with a complaint about the difficulty of verification. But we also are in favor of verification. However, the fact is that from the technical viewpoint, monitoring and verification have ceased to be a problem.

Recently a work was brought out on this subject, prepared by a staff member of the Stockholm International Peace Problems Research Institute. The book is entitled "Verification: How Much is Enough?" [by Allan S. Krass] It tells of the quite superlative technical facilities for detection and monitoring, and draws the conclusion that the main obstacle is a political one -- that is, the absence of the desire and will, which is aggravated by psychological obstacles. It says that to get out of this impasse it is necessary to cooperate for the achievement of some common goal. As the book says, this inverse relationship and this interrelationship shows that disarmament and trust go hand in hand.

Indeed, we have invited the United States to cooperate in overcoming the evil logic of the armaments race, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said in his replies to the Algerian journal REVOLUTION AFRICAINE. We invite the United States to follow our example and to make the moratorium on tests everlasting.

But it seems that the Pentagon has a timetable for explosions. There are 16 scheduled for this year; let the world be indignant, let legal commitments be broken -- explosions are more important for the United States.

Administration 'Forced to Maneuver'

LD031815 Moscow TASS in English 1742 GMT 3 Apr 86

[Text] Washington April 3 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports: Is it possible to reach such a limit of cynicism as to claim that continuing nuclear arms testing... strengthens international security and even prevents a proliferation of nuclear weapons? It turns out that it is possible. It is precisely such claims that are contained in a letter published here of Frank Guffney, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defence, addressed to Edward Markey, member of the U.S. House of Representatives. The congressman turned to the Pentagon for explanations of the administration's stand on the issue of a general and complete ban on nuclear arms testing.

This problem is now in the foreground of political life in the USA as a result of the initiative of the Soviet Union, which has introduced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. Broad U.S. public circles have come out in support of the Soviet proposal and demanded that the U.S. Administration follow the USSR's example. Under the pressure of such sentiments the U.S. House of Representatives has recently adopted a resolution urging the White House to open talks immediately with the aim of concluding a treaty of a general and complete prohibition of nuclear arms testing.

Considering these sentiments, the U.S. Administration, which is building up the arms race for the benefit of the military-industrial complex, is forced to manoeuvre. Its representatives claim that they are in general for such a treaty, yet not now, but some time in the future -- the more distant future the better. This theme is echoed in the above-mentioned letter from the representative of the Pentagon. It is the long-term aim of the United States, the letter said, to conclude a treaty on general and complete prohibition of nuclear arms testing. After paying lip service to that lofty aim, the author of the letter returns to its Pentagon positions. So far, it said, nuclear testing is necessary, since its termination would allegedly lead to a swift build up of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers in order to "make sure that these weapons are efficient. [no closing quotation mark as received]

One cannot help being amazed by such a distorted logic of the high-ranking officials of the U.S. Administration, which is using sordid methods in order to confuse public and carry on nuclear testing at all costs and at an even higher rate. Thus, right after the underground blast of a nuclear device in a Nevada test range on March 23, the White House was in a hurry to announce a forthcoming new nuclear blast. As American experts and the press admit, this testing is connected above all with the feverish build up of its arsenals of the latest nuclear weapons by the USA and the "star wars" programme. It is not accidental that the draft military budget of the USA for the 1987 fiscal year provides for a 24 per cent increase, as compared with the current year, in appropriation on research to create new nuclear arms systems alone. This, as the BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS points out, makes the growth of spending on these aims very swift. On top of that, as the "TIME" weekly says, big additional sums are granted to the Pentagon under "covert articles." Such covert appropriations on research, development and purchase of secret weapons increased from 892 million dollars in 1981 to 8.6 billion dollars planned for next fiscal year, the journal stresses.

Adelman Remarks Criticized

PM031507 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "K. Adelman Statement"]

[Text] Washington, 29 Mar -- Despite the world public's persistent demands to Washington to accede to the USSR's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions the Reagan administration intends to continue nuclear tests. This was confirmed in an interview given to AP by K. Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA].

"By means of nuclear tests we should guarantee the maximum reliability of nuclear weapons," he stated. It is common knowledge that the theme of verifying the "reliability" of the U.S. nuclear potential is a propaganda ploy used to camouflage Washington's unwillingness to end nuclear explosions.

According to the U.S. press, this position taken by the administration is connected primarily with plans to modernize and build up the nuclear arsenals and also with the "star wars" program. During the interview, Adelman hinted that the tests at the Nevada range are aimed specifically at creating [sozdaniye] new types of nuclear warheads.

The U.S. ACDA director again put forward absurd fabrications about alleged "violations" by the Soviet Union of treaties signed by it in the arms limitation sphere. However, Adelman's own comments show who has actually chosen the path of violating and undermining the joint Soviet-U.S. accords in this sphere. For example, the administration representative bluntly stated that Washington is considering the question of expanding its nuclear submarine fleet in such a way as to exceed the limitations imposed by the SALT II treaty on the number of strategic missiles with multiple warheads.

'Restraint' Not Infinite

PM040848 Moscow NOVYE VREMYA in Russian No 12, 21 Mar 86 pp 12-13

[Article by Lev Semeyko, deputy chairman of the Soviet Peace Defense Committee Disarmament Commission: "USSR-United States: Mutual Examples Are Needed"]

[Excerpts] Now that a real possibility of ending the madness of the arms race is being opened up, new tasks are facing not only governments but also the peoples' movement for peace: They must define their position, elaborate forms and consistency of actions, and begin to act. The peace champions' unity of purpose also gives rise to a common approach to achieving it. This is the chief thing. Of course, owing to the complexity of the problems of war and peace and the multifarious composition of the movement of peace-loving forces, its members have different viewpoints on how the disarmament process should proceed. But one difference here is of a fundamental nature.

Many peace champions in the West believe that it is necessary to begin with the USSR's unilateral disarmament. Why? Because they sincerely hope that the United States will without fail follow the Soviet example, and then the way to general and complete disarmament will be clear. Moreover, representatives of certain antiwar organizations have repeatedly assured us that, if the Washington administration and NATO do not immediately meet the USSR halfway, then the fighters for peace will make them do so by their mass actions.

On 15 January 1986, guided by the desire to take one more practical step in the context of the program to rid the planet of nuclear weapons by the beginning of the next millennium, the USSR extended its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions by 3 months. This moratorium would continue in force if Washington followed its Russian U.S. Defense Secretary F. Weinberger at once declared that the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on nuclear explosions was unacceptable to the American side. However, in its reply to the new Soviet initiative, the United States took a completely negative attitude to the very idea of unilateral moratoriums.

Only Together

An example from recent history is significant in this connection -- the U.S. Administration's attitude toward the Soviet-American joint statement on agreed principles of disarmament talks (1961). Soon after President Nixon entered the White House in 1969, the USSR proposed resuming the talks on general and complete disarmament on the basis of the statement.

But the U.S. President refused. Recalling that period, the well-known U.S. scientist and public figure C. Price says that, astounded at that refusal, he turned for an explanation to F. Ikle, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. "I was even more astounded," Price points out, "When Doctor Ikle, that product of the military-industrial complex, told me I was naive: We never intended to take the agreed statement seriously. It was simply propaganda to counter Russian propaganda!" Not satisfied with that reply, Price tried to get an explanation from W. Foster, who headed the agency at the time the joint statement was drawn up. This is what he replied: "Jack Kennedy and I were sincere in our support for the aims of the statement that was being drawn up," but after the USSR agreed to those aims, "our most difficult negotiations were not with the Russians but with the Pentagon."

The present situation must not repeat that described by Price. The Soviet-American joint statement in Geneva last November must not be regarded as a new model of a U.S. propaganda concession. The American public and sober-minded circles in Washington still have to deal a serious rebuff to the U.S. forces (and they are the same forces as 15 years ago) which oppose the practical realization of the provisions of the Geneva statement and the concept set forth once again at the 27th CPSU Congress of curtailing the nuclear arms race, eliminating nuclear arms, and preventing the militarization of space.

The Soviet Union cannot endlessly display unilateral restraint, particularly with regard to nuclear tests. If the United States and its allies continue to totally ignore examples of our country's love of peace and, moreover, respond to them by stepping up the arms race, the Soviet Union will be faced with the need to take countermeasures to ensure its security and that of its allies.

It is still not too late to avoid a new twist to the arms race spiral. At the same time, the antiwar movements do not have so much time left at their disposal to change the present situation with the help of such vigorous mass actions as forced the United States in the recent past to abandon its planned deployment of neutron bombs in Western Europe.

Chervov on Test Ban

LD021830 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Apr 86

[Interview with Colonel General Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, directorate chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by unidentified correspondent, date and place not given; live or recorded--from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Correspondent] Nikolay Fedorovich, as we know, a routine nuclear blast was carried out in Nevada on 22 March. The press have reported that new tests are being prepared. That is, it is clear that the U.S. Administration is refusing to cease nuclear tests. At the same time Washington declares that the United States has allegedly fallen behind the USSR in this sphere and, therefore, must continue its tests. What can you say about this?

[Chervov] Such statements by the leaders of the U.S. Administration do not accord with reality. Facts show that the United States has carried out more nuclear blasts than all the world's nuclear powers put together. Compared with the USSR, the United States has carried out approximately one-third more nuclear blasts. And the United States has carried out more nuclear blasts in each individual environment -- in the atmosphere, under the ground, and under water.

If one looks at the situation over the past 2 years, the picture here is thus: In 1984, the United States and the USSR carried out approximately equal numbers of tests of nuclear weapons; in 1985, the United States carried out 18 nuclear blasts while the USSR, before the introduction of the moratorium, that is, before 6 August, carried out only 9 nuclear blasts, and 2 of these were for peaceful aims -- thus, virtually only half the number. These are the statistics. As you can see, there can be no question of any falling behind by the United States in this sphere. On the contrary, during the time that the moratorium has been in operation, the gap in favor of the United States has increased even further. Therefore, those who say that the United States has allegedly fallen behind the USSR would in fact like to secure this position for the United States in which they should and would have the opportunity to continue nuclear tests, to create new types of nuclear weapons, to build up nuclear arsenals, and thus initiate a nuclear arms race. The real reason for the unwillingness of the U.S. Administration to renounce nuclear blasts lies in its wish to destroy the military balance in its own favor. It is precisely toward this that the program of creating [sozdaniye] nuclear charges for various purposes for space-strike weapons according to the "star wars" plan and also the programs for creating [sozdaniye] and deploying new strategic armaments -- in particular the ballistic missiles MX, Trident II, and Midgetman -- are aimed. There are simply no other reasons. Such is the truth.

[Correspondent] Thank you.

[Exploit \(msn\) / exploit \(ie\) Linux Back](#)

FORM 1041 (Rev. 3-77) 10-10-77

[Vagrant Natives or "Falling Star" Shoveler? A Delusion? "Bird's Nest" Eggs?]

```
(Test) = 0 millisecond; // gives time taken by each iteration, including the cost of computing Test()
return (long) ((time - start) / noOfIterations); // returns the average time
```

However, there have been major advances in position 2.5. Firstly, who has become more and appreciative of a given work. These so-called "non-essential" exposures" of persons of mass destruction are only being a dangerous consequence of the fact that they also have a destructive impact on the individual.

During a trip to the western United States in 1961 President Kennedy was struck by large centers in New Mexico. It had been looked on as a center of an underground nuclear complex being carried out there. Two U.S. military scientists and an astronaut who accompanied the trip enthusiastically described to him what they were to develop a smaller but more powerful nuclear bomb. Kennedy listened without comment and took President Kennedy along with one of his advisers, McGeorge Bundy, in discussing the matter with enthusiasm. People were so sure of the success of the underground nuclear weapons tests to produce a "fission bomb" but just happened that it was the deaths of people will be killed?

Some of the consequences of the worldwide outbreak of SARS have been seen in the province of Guangdong, including a 3.5 per cent decline in official domestic tourism initiation aligned with our country's own decline in international travel (Chen & Gao, 2003). A partial ban on outdoor swimming pools in the subcontinent of South India, for instance, was also implemented.

The U.S. President's trip to the west of the country, during which he was joined the water caused by the underground surface vegetation of the mountains, and which was the had decided to sign the aforementioned treaty. It was only some time after his death, in a book published in the United States in 1971, that other very close witnesses to Kennedy's visit their recollections of his activities toward the national health and have described how seriously Kennedy himself was engaged in the country's ecological situation. It was in Washington, however, around 1968, with a growing of concern, a strong struggle began in Congress. On 16 September 1971, when the Senate had approved the treaty after heated debate, Kennedy was not in the White House any longer. When he was the last's public will. "The President himself, in 1971, the National Science Foundation in the west would work more effectively in the country and was closer than before. (1971). Since then to protect natural resources, and to save the country's environment, though it was the latter years when the work was done. The work has been made to make the study of subjects which have the same theme as the previous one, research on ecological, ecological environment.

As was the case 23 years back, the pillars of the powerful military-industrial complex in the United States are bitterly opposed to a complete cessation of nuclear tests, because they are eager to develop new kinds of weapons of mass destruction. And from this standpoint it can be said that a complete ban on such tests, since this depends on Washington's opinion, is being sacrificed to the Pentagon's "star wars" program. Let us explain what is meant here.

There is much evidence from members of the present American Administration, up to and including the White House chief, the U.S. secretary of defense, and other figures, who speak unanimously about the fact that the underground nuclear explosions being carried out by the American military are an important part of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), that is to say, the spreading of the arms race into outer space.

Thus, in a recent speech, Pentagon chief C. Weinberger acknowledged that study of the possibility for destroying an enemy missile "using nuclear energy" -- nuclear explosions -- is one avenue of the SDI program.

Representative E. Markey has described the tests of nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers being conducted by the Pentagon as a key element of the "star wars" program.

The Soviet side has repeatedly pointed out that a refusal by the United States to commit itself, together with other countries, not to proceed with the militarization of outer space would have the most fatal consequences for the cause of disarmament and, therefore, for the fortunes of world peace.

Will the complete ban on nuclear tests, which the world community is seeking, not be sacrificed to the Pentagon's "star wars" program? The question is a legitimate and urgent one.

Policy 'Robbed of All Sense'

PN008142 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 86 Second Edition p 3

[Ya. Kornilov article under the rubric "The Comprehensive Peace Program":
"Central Avenue"]

[Text] The modern world is complex and militarized, filled with concerns and hopes. A keen, intense struggle rages in the international arena. The arms race unleashed by imperialism has led to a situation where the 20th century is nearing its end in world politics overshadowed by this question: Will mankind manage to escape the nuclear danger, or will the policy of confrontation, leading to the increased likelihood of nuclear conflicts, prevail? The atmosphere of nuclear confrontation dictates the need to double and triple our efforts to overcome the negative trends that have grown up in the world arena in recent years. It calls for new approaches, methods, and forms of mutual relations between the various world systems, states, and regions.

The program, generally accepted, analyzed in the article and scope of the measures to be carried out in the CPSU Central Committee was clearly expressed in the documents of the 19th party congress. And it is precisely this program, a long series of great (positive) and not so great (negative) steps, that will lead to the achievement of the goal of world peace and stability. The program is not only a set of measures, but also a set of principles, methods, and forms of mutual relations between the various world systems, states, and regions.

in the conditions of the total unacceptability of nuclear war, not confrontation, but peaceful coexistence between systems must become the law in interstate relations. On the basis of this inescapable political axiom, the congress stressed that the struggle against the nuclear danger and the arms race and for the preservation and strengthening of universal peace is the party's main line in the world arena.

An all-embracing program for this struggle, taking the form of an alloy of the philosophy of the formation of a secure world in the nuclear and space age and a platform of concrete actions, was put forward in the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and developed in the congress documents. "It is a question specifically of a concrete plan of action with a strict time frame," the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the congress stressed. "The USSR intends to strive persistently for its implementation, seeing this as the central avenue of its foreign policy in the coming years."

The large-scale Soviet initiatives are at the center of the world public's attention. The international reactions to them are to be found in millions of lines of print in newspapers and magazines and thousands of kilometers of teletype tape. Of course, these reactions are not identical -- they depend on the positions expressed by the particular mass information organ and the forces behind it. But if we highlight the basic, main element from among the flow of remarks, there is every reason to say: The Soviet initiatives have been assessed on all continents as historic in their scale and significance, because their implementation would open up for mankind a fundamentally different phase of development and an opportunity to concentrate on creation alone. It is stressed particularly that the international policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state arises from the humane nature of the socialist society, which is free of exploitation and oppression and has no classes or social groups with an interest in unleashing wars, and that this policy is indissolubly linked with the strategic tasks of the USSR's accelerated socioeconomic development and expresses the Soviet people's one desire -- to engage in creative labor and live in peace with all the peoples.

And that is indeed so. What, in fact, are the basic principles of the program for universal security through disarmament which is today the pivot of Soviet foreign policy strategy and tactics? The core of this program, which is based on the premise that true security in our age is guaranteed not by an extremely high level, but by an extremely low level of the strategic balance, is the proposal on the elimination of nuclear weapons by stages, with a ban on space strike arms. Mankind can and must enter the 3d millenium free from the fear of nuclear catastrophe. A real step along the path to this goal is the complete ending and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, because not conducting such tests means beginning to move toward the elimination of nuclear arsenals. At the same time the USSR is in favor of completely eliminating chemical weapons. Renouncing other weapons of mass destruction. Making conventional arms and armed forces the subject of agreed reductions. Bringing into play the entire existing system of talks and ensuring the best possible performance of disarmament mechanisms. There is no weapon in the world which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or ban on a reciprocal basis with the use of effective verification; with a view to ending the accelerated material preparations for war, our country, which advocates that the whole range of disarmament problems be examined as a whole, is prepared to go as far as other states are prepared to go. "By getting rid of the spine-chilling fear of the nuclear winter, your unprecedented actions and long-term plans create the political and ideological hopes for a flowering spring in a world without nuclear weapons -- weapons of mass destruction," the American Communist leader Gus Hall stated from the platform of the CPSU Congress.

That is one approach to the problem of international relations in the world (war and peace); an approach which is a result of the development of the sciences of the age and of the present-day international situation. But there are other approaches in the world which adhere to a different approach, calling a totalitarian approach approach to the same problem. Absolutism, calling the same approach to the same problem has been warmly welcomed the progress and forward to the 19th century of disappointment and for ensuring the reliable security of all citizens and nations. During that very period, the U.S. President, the Democratic Party, and other nations in the American Administration have been following a system of approach and approach and rising the thesis that strength and strength allow to the "strong" dominating position in American foreign policy. "The main reason for the war is a question of power," Kerzhakov noted in his interview for the Nigerian magazine "International Situation". "How people connected with the U.S. military-industrial complex look upon it, we can see in light! How forcefully they fling themselves upon the 'weak' or 'strong'!"

Acting as the locomotive of militarism in the international arena, the American system stubbornly refuses to renounce the same, fundamental position -- that of dominating in arms race in space. Regarding strategic arms and military-industrial complex, the U.S. can propose, which is calculated in secure unilateral advantages to maintain the system of untying the European missile "arms," then try to tie it, which is impossible. A strong public indignation was aroused by Washington's refusal to respond to the USSR's proposal initiative and consent to the ending of all nuclear tests. Most of responsibility for the way in which the U.S. raising various events of world and international initiatives -- ostentatiously, arrogantly, with disregard for the interests of the world community. No sense of realism or responsibility!

History has confirmed repeatedly that attempts by the U.S. Administration to achieve military superiority over the USSR have always failed. They will not succeed the attempt at nuclear blackmail, in response to which the USSR will not raise its shield. The same thing happened when the United States tried to maintain its position in terms of the right of the nuclear armament and the same will happen again the attempt to violate the parity of strategic forces.

Today, the U.S. Administration is trying to achieve its purpose by using all aggressive devices and means. It is necessary to know the limits of its power, the limits of its aggression, the limits of its aggression.

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The first of the three main sections of the report is devoted to a description of the work done during the year. This section is divided into three parts: a general description of the work, a description of the work done in the various departments, and a description of the work done in the various sections of the departments.

The second section of the report is devoted to a description of the results of the work done during the year. This section is divided into three parts: a general description of the results, a description of the results in the various departments, and a description of the results in the various sections of the departments.

CONCLUSIONS

The third section of the report is devoted to a description of the conclusions reached during the year. This section is divided into three parts: a general description of the conclusions, a description of the conclusions in the various departments, and a description of the conclusions in the various sections of the departments.

The fourth section of the report is devoted to a description of the recommendations made during the year. This section is divided into three parts: a general description of the recommendations, a description of the recommendations in the various departments, and a description of the recommendations in the various sections of the departments.

The fifth section of the report is devoted to a description of the work done during the year. This section is divided into three parts: a general description of the work, a description of the work done in the various departments, and a description of the work done in the various sections of the departments.

The sixth section of the report is devoted to a description of the results of the work done during the year. This section is divided into three parts: a general description of the results, a description of the results in the various departments, and a description of the results in the various sections of the departments.

The seventh section of the report is devoted to a description of the conclusions reached during the year. This section is divided into three parts: a general description of the conclusions, a description of the conclusions in the various departments, and a description of the conclusions in the various sections of the departments.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA QUESTIONS U.S. CLAIMS ON TEST CURB BREACHES

PM070340 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Tolkunov dispatch under the rubric "Rejoinder": "Feeling Depressed..."]

[Text New York--There is alarm in the White House. Do the Russians possess a new secret weapon? Is there new information about the increasing "Soviet threat?" Or perhaps Moscow is "not playing fair" at the arms control talks?

No, it is much worse. It appears that the Russians are not cheating. The point is that secret investigation data of a number of U.S. intelligence services have become known in Washington. They call in question the administration's previous "conclusions" that the Soviet Union is allegedly violating the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, signed by our countries but, incidentally, not ratified by the U.S. Congress. Yet it is precisely these "conclusions" which provided one of the arguments for the administration's refusal to join the moratorium and much else.

This is why Washington administration staffers are in such a state now. The President has signed Directive 202 which demands that a report be submitted on how the new evaluation of information about Soviet tests will affect earlier U.S. claims that Moscow has violated its treaty obligations. The situation is indeed very tricky if even R. Batzel, the director of the Livermore Laboratory where new nuclear warheads are being developed, declares on the basis of received information that the Russians "have not been deceiving us."

And so they are arguing endlessly in the administration now whether or not to withdraw that accusation. The "hawks" through whose fault nuclear explosions continue to rock the Nevada desert are very loath to lose face. A "Solomonic solution" has been suggested by R. Perle, assistant secretary of defense, who proposed that the administration seal and suppress the compromising intelligence information. As if it had never existed, and have done with it.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1328

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

WARSAW PACT PROPOSES NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN EUROPE

Pact Message to West

PM091306 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Apr 86 First Edition p 4

["Socialist Countries Proposal in the Interest of Freeing Europe From Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] The address by the Warsaw Treaty member-states to the European nations, the United States, and Canada on the question of establishing nuclear-free zones in Europe was given to the Embassies of Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United States, Turkey, Finland, France, Switzerland, Sweden, and Yugoslavia at the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry on 8 April 1986, as agreed by the Warsaw Treaty member-states.

The document is being handed over to the other European nations and Canada through the Bulgarian Embassies in Moscow, Belgrade, Berne, London, Luxembourg, Paris, and Rome.

The latest initiative by the Socialist countries is a concrete manifestation of the agreed foreign policy course worked out at the Sofia meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee.

It accords with the program for establishing a nuclear-free world advanced in Mikhail Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement and with the proposals set out in the communique of the Warsaw meeting of the Foreign Ministers Committee.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states express the hope that the European countries, the United States, and Canada will give attention to the address and respond to it in a constructive spirit. Address by the Warsaw Pact member-states to the European states, the United States, and Canada on the Question of Establishing Nuclear-Free Zones in Europe:-

In today's complex international situation, when the peoples of Europe and the whole of mankind are faced with a question in all its acuteness — to live in peace or to perish in nuclear war — the Warsaw Pact member-states believe that decisive actions and specific measures are necessary more than ever in order to immediately end the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race; to prevent its spread into space; and to begin disarmament and the elimination of the nuclear threat.

In connection with this, they support the program put forward by the Soviet Union for the total elimination everywhere of nuclear and chemical weapons before the end of this century, a program that also envisages the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces.

They are convinced that the implementation of nuclear disarmament would lead to the creation of a secure peace for all the European peoples, and for the peoples of the whole planet. The complete elimination of the medium-range missiles of the USSR and United States in Europe would be an exceptionally important initial step in the issue of freeing the European Continent from nuclear arms, and of strengthening European Security.

Proposals for the creation of zones free of nuclear arms in different areas of the European Continent, which the Warsaw Pact member-states consistently and persistently support, follow in the general line of efforts to remove the nuclear threat. They note that in several areas of the world, nonnuclear zones are already a political reality.

The creation of nonnuclear zones in Europe at the present time is as topical as ever. Here, as nowhere else, the concentration of armed forces and armaments has reached dangerous limits. The level of nuclear confrontation is high and the risk of an accidental breakout of nuclear war great.

It is the belief of the member-states that the creation of nuclear zones in Europe would promote a strengthening of security for participant countries in such zones, as well as European and universal security; consolidation of stability and mutual trust; a restoration of detente; a reduction in armed forces and armaments; a strengthening of the procedure relating to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; and an expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The creation of nonnuclear zones is closely linked with the development of good-neighborliness, mutual understanding, and cooperation.

The governments of a number of other European states are also in favor of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe. This idea enjoys the support of parliaments, political parties, and broad public circles. Proposals on the establishment of such zones in the continent have been put forward as an important measure for strengthening confidence at the Stockholm conference, and are being examined at other international forums. The United Nations attaches great importance to the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

The Warsaw Pact member-states are against the buildup of nuclear arms both in Europe and everywhere in the world. They are in favor of halting further siting of nuclear arms on the continent, in favor of the reduction of nuclear arms, and for the complete liberation of Europe from both medium-range and tactical nuclear arms. Their proposals on this account remain valid.

The Warsaw Pact member-states base their views on the fact that the realization of proposals for the creation of zones completely free of nuclear weapons in various regions of Europe depends on political will, and on the joint decision of the interested states of the corresponding regions. Further efforts on their part, and an increase in the constructive contribution on the part of other states, are required. Accords for the creation of nuclear-free zones should correspond to the commonly recognized norms of international law, and should secure a reliable observance of their genuinely nuclear-free status with appropriate verification.

Moreover, states possessing nuclear weapons should take on an obligation to strictly respect the status of nuclear-free zones, and refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against states forming part of such zones.

The Warsaw Pact member-states are convinced that the creation and effectiveness of nonnuclear zones depend to a large extent also on how other states, those off nuclear ones, view them. They noted that the USSR, resolutely supporting the creation of nonnuclear zones in Europe, expresses its readiness to give the appropriate guarantees to such zones and they expect the United States and also Britain and France to manifest the same attitude.

The allied states welcome the efforts of corresponding states designed to create a nonnuclear zone in northern Europe. The prospect of consolidating the current virtually nonnuclear status of this region is becoming more realistic, thanks to the readiness of the USSR to give the appropriate guarantees to the countries that are members of this zone by concluding multilateral or bilateral agreements with them.

Similar guarantees by the United States, Britain, and France would help to raise the effectiveness of this zone. The member-states of the Warsaw Pact also note the readiness of the USSR to undertake other concrete steps for the implementation of the idea of creating a nonnuclear zone in northern Europe.

They also come out in favor of the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons in the Balkans, and of efforts to strengthen security, and to develop trust, good neighborliness and cooperation between the Balkan states. They welcome the multilateral dialogue on this question which has begun between the Balkan states and call on them to continue and deepen it.

The Warsaw Pact member-states support Sweden's proposal to create a corridor free of battlefield nuclear arms along the line where the states of the Warsaw Pact and those of NATO meet. They believe that, in order to raise the effectiveness of the corridor, it should be widened on both sides of the line of contact, taking into account the tactical-technical characteristics of these arms. It would be possible to begin creating this corridor with central Europe.

Adoption by the Soviet Union and the United States of a mutual commitment to refrain from siting any nuclear arms on the territory of states where there are no such weapons, and also not to build up stocks of nuclear arms and not to replace them with new ones in those countries where they are already sited, would be of great significance for the practical implementation of the idea of setting up nuclear-free zones in Europe. At the same time, it is necessary that nonnuclear states, on whose territory nuclear arms are not at present sited, do not allow such arms to be sited on their territory. These measures would assist the prevention of the territorial proliferation of nuclear arms, the limitation of the nuclear arms race, the safeguarding of the balance of forces at the lowest level, and the preservation of the *de facto* nuclear-free status of those states on whose territory there are no nuclear arms.

Taking as a premise the need to free Europe of the nuclear threat; desiring the total elimination of nuclear arms from the lives of peoples; bearing in mind the experience that has been acquired in the sphere of forming nuclear-free zones and the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act; and striving to develop the all-European process, the Warsaw Pact member-states:

— Appeal to the peoples of Europe, the United States, and Canada to express in concrete terms to implement the proposals for limitation of nuclear arms at the European Conference;

— Call for support for the efforts of states that advocate the limitation of nuclear arms, including their efforts in the relevant international forums;

— Express their readiness to take part in the conducting of an intensified and specific exchange of opinions between the appropriate Governmental organs with the aim of formulating the implementation of practical steps toward creating nuclear-free zones in northern Europe and in the Balkans;

— Demand that in favor of talks being held between the Governmental organs in the context of creating a committee that will conduct research satisfactory to the peoples of Europe.

Declarations of the German Part are considered from the nuclear aspect and not from the economic. They demand the rigorous and decisive ending of all nuclear, nuclear and conventional, and participation in military and political alliances; the removal and the withdrawal. The creation of nuclear-free zones in the European continent should become an important step in the way to securing the security of peoples in this continent, and ending danger of nuclear weapons.

"Government" with Declaration

Joint US-Russia Declaration Service to Russian (and US) 9 Apr 66

— "The World Today" program presented by German (West) (West) (West)

[Text] The German Part emphasizes have addressed to European states, and also to the United States and Canada, a new proposal directed at achieving nuclear-free nuclear weapons. It is a matter of the pressing need to support the efforts of the world people, which is demanding the creation of nuclear-free zones in the continent. It is the conviction of the organs of the German Part that the creation of such zones could contribute to the strengthening of our own European, but also overall security.

For their part the German Part states calling their readiness to take part in the holding of a deepened and specific exchange of opinions among the Governmental organs with the aim of promoting the realization of practical steps toward creating nuclear-free zones in northern Europe and in the Balkans. The new satisfaction of the allies included countries is further manifestation of the intensified foreign policy line worked out at the 1965 conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the German Part member-states. It is consistent with the program for the creation of a nuclear-free world put forward to the members by Wilhelm Springer-Schöckert in 1955, and also with the proposals set out in the resolution of the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers Committee in Bonn.

United States News Conference

United States News Conference, International Service in London, 1950, 1 Apr 50

(Third) News, 8 Apr 1950. — The Soviet Press conference' agreed to the American charges, the United States, and stands on the initiative to various points of danger of peace resulting from all nuclear weapons to be replaced by the need to take effective actions to create a nuclear-free world. Chairman Acheson, head of the Press Department of the U.S. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated here at a press conference today.

The objective of nuclear-free world would be a measure aimed at the peace based upon the nuclear danger and toward creating a nuclear-free Europe, and a real, orderly world. This is the aim of the Soviet Press conference' initiative, which aims at preventing the ways of finding points of contact and actually accomplishing agreement.

One of the main reasons for the fact that up to now the idea of creating nuclear-free world in Europe has been meeting up against resistance and is not being implemented lies in pressure from the U.S. Administration — specifically, as U.S. administration in western Europe — and in the Soviet response to U.S. attitude toward this idea, Chairman Acheson said. The negative stance of the United States regarding the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans is also well-known. Therefore, a request to the question of the initiative to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans depends on the political will, persistence, and specific efforts of the concerned countries, and on the political responsibility of those same figures to show the growing pressure from the United States side.

As for the USSR, the position is clear. To support the creation of nuclear-free zone and are prepared to guarantee nuclear-free zone. In other words, apart from nuclear club nuclear weapons and not to use this against countries where there are none of these weapons, Leninist stressed.

The last question USSR representative asked at the press conference was: Why has United States' a nuclear-free zone, and he asked to this committee whether there were plans in the USSR which had this intention.

In the Soviet Union the need does not arise to declare individual mass organizations, because there is no conflict between the status of the population of individual zone and the status of the government, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative replied.

The Soviet Union is in favor of any form individual zone, but the idea of Europe, banning nuclear-free. Additionally, Mikhail Gorbachev's 13 January statement proposed a specific program for freeing the whole world from nuclear weapons.

Additionally, in those countries where governments are not attempting such a specific program for eliminating nuclear weapons, the demand arises for individual zone to declare themselves nuclear-free. This demand illustrates the aim of the population, which supports the idea of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, and the idea of a nuclear-free world, the head of the Press Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained.

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CDS: 1280/1119

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1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

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On the basis of the above, the following conclusions can be drawn:

Abstract: *Wages* (Springer-Verlag) is a collection of essays devoted to the study of the wage. The book's approach to the analysis of such an important problem as studying the market mechanism leads to the final analysis the most interesting part of the treatment of any issue is to take a look at what is going on in the process of market mechanism out of the present conditions. This is also the essence of

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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be addressed. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be addressed. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

2. The second step is to gather relevant information and resources. This may involve researching existing solutions, consulting with experts, or collecting data.

3. The third step is to develop a plan or strategy to address the problem. This involves breaking down the problem into smaller, manageable tasks and determining the sequence of actions to be taken.

4. The fourth step is to implement the plan. This involves carrying out the tasks identified in the plan and monitoring progress as the work progresses.

5. The fifth step is to evaluate the results and make adjustments as needed. This involves comparing the actual outcomes with the expected results and identifying any areas for improvement.

6. The final step is to document the process and results. This involves creating a record of the work done, the challenges encountered, and the solutions found, which can be used for future reference.

1. The Commission is of the opinion that the present situation of international law is such that it is necessary to consider the possibility of a new convention, or at least some form of international instrument, to deal with the problem of the protection of the rights of the individual. It is of the opinion that such a convention should be based on the principle of the universality of human rights, and should be open to all states. It is of the opinion that such a convention should be based on the principle of the universality of human rights, and should be open to all states. It is of the opinion that such a convention should be based on the principle of the universality of human rights, and should be open to all states.

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that the only acceptable outcome requires the following

conditions: (1) immediate withdrawal of all US forces from the Golan Heights

(2) immediate release of all Palestinian prisoners

(3) the establishment of a high-level working group to discuss the future of the Golan Heights and the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The working group should be composed of representatives of the Israeli Government, the PLO, and the United States. The working group should meet in a neutral location, such as Geneva, and should be chaired by a neutral third party. The working group should discuss the future of the Golan Heights and the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and should reach a final agreement on these issues. The working group should also discuss the future of the Palestinian refugees and the future of the Israeli-Arab conflict. The working group should reach a final agreement on these issues as well.

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WILLIAM TAYLOR AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NEW PROPOSALS PROPOSED TO REVERSE WILLIAM POLICY

Reversing THE AID TO England 12 Mar 64 p 1

(Continued)

The first of these proposals is to reverse the policy of the United States Government in regard to the free zone. This policy has been in effect since 1945 and has been the basis of the United States' position in the free zone. The second proposal is to reverse the policy of the United States Government in regard to the free zone. This policy has been in effect since 1945 and has been the basis of the United States' position in the free zone.

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The fourth proposal is to reverse the policy of the United States Government in regard to the free zone. This policy has been in effect since 1945 and has been the basis of the United States' position in the free zone.

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BRITISH

WASH DCTED U.S. SENATORS—Washington, April 9 (TASS)—Opponents U.S. Policymakers
Senator Edward Kennedy, Charles McNamara, Gary Hart and a number of other
lawmakers held a press conference at the U.S. Congress that having taken an
obstructionist stand on the issue of the moratorium on nuclear explosions, the
Reagan administration let the opportunity to arrest and reverse the arms race
pass. Senator Kennedy stressed that President Reagan's intention to go ahead
with nuclear testing undermined the prospects for control over armaments. He
said that the reason behind the Reagan administration's unwillingness to join
the movement to that continued nuclear explosions were needed for the
implementation of the "star wars" programme. Senator Claiborne Pell considers
that the U.S. move to go ahead with nuclear tests would be an irrational
step detrimental to the United States itself. He emphasized that there were
no reasons whatsoever to conduct nuclear tests at a time when the Soviet Union
abided by the moratorium introduced by it. Senator Tim Wirth said that
common sense and security considerations imperatively dictated the need to
work for achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban. [Text] [Moscow TASS
in English 0339 GMT 9 Apr 88] /8309

WASH DCTED SWEDISH-SOVIET TALKS—Geneva, March 21 (TASS)—Soviet-Swedish
consultations at experts' level were held here on March 26-27 within the
framework of the conference on disarmament. The consultations dealt with
the question of using all achievements of cosmology for the purpose of a
treaty on a total ban on nuclear tests. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English
1731 GMT 23 Mar 88] /8309

WASH DCTED ARLMAN—Despite the demand addressed to Washington by world
opinion that it should join in the moratorium on all nuclear explosions,
unilaterally introduced by the USSR, the Reagan administration intends to
continue the tests. This was confirmed by Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. In an interview with the AP agency, he
reiterated the absurd fabrications about alleged violations of arms limitation
agreements by the Soviet Union. However, Adelman's pronouncements show who has
really set out to undermine the Soviet-U.S. accord on the subject. The
administration spokesman stated bluntly that Washington is considering expanding
the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet to such an extent that it would exceed the
limits imposed by the SALT II agreement on the numbers of strategic missiles
with multiple warheads. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT
20 Mar 88] 8309

TASS CITES NORWAY'S STRAY--Oslo March 24 TASS--Norwegian Foreign Minister Sven Stray criticized the USA for its latest nuclear explosion at the Nevada testing site. Speaking on Norwegian television, he voiced his amazement that the U.S. Administration had went on [as printed] with nuclear weapon tests despite numerous appeals and demands addressed to it. "In the present situation the United States should have shown more restraint and caution," he said. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0734 GMT 24 Mar 86] /8309

TASS CITES SWEDEN'S CARLSSON--Stockholm March 24 TASS--Today Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson of Sweden condemned the USA's testing a nuclear device at the proving ground in Nevada on Saturday. A report about the test, the head of the Swedish Government said, arouses great disappointment. A nuclear test moratorium is an effective instrument for stemming the arms race. Ingvar Carlsson positively assessed the USSR's stand in this matter. "The leaders of the six countries," he recalled, "appealed to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and to President Ronald Reagan of the United States not to conduct nuclear explosions until a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. In response the Soviet leader stated the readiness of the Soviet side to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions beyond March 31, this year, until the United States conducted another test. Therefore, particular regret is being aroused by the fact that the USA has now preferred to carry out such an explosion." The prime minister of Sweden emphasized that the six countries would continue their energetic activities with a view to achieving a comprehensive termination of nuclear tests. "Representatives of our countries established contacts recently with the aim of working out additional measures in this direction," he said. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0745 GMT 25 Mar 86] /8309

PRC DENIES TALKS WITH U.S.--Beijing, 25 Mar--A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman has denied a report in the U.S. newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST that the United States is discussing with the PRC the installation on PRC territory of American seismic equipment for recording "underground nuclear tests in the Soviet Union." As reported by XINHUA, the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman described the report as "unfounded." [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Mar 86 Morning Edition p 5] /8309

CSO: 5200/1328

RELATED ISSUES

REVIEW OF SOVIET MONOGRAPH ON AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 86 (signed to press 14 Jan 86) pp 135-137

[A. Lebedev review: "The Choice Facing Mankind"]

[Text] "The course of world development is confronting mankind with many questions of a global nature. Scientific thought must provide the correct answers to these questions"--these are words from the draft new CPSU Program. The collective of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO is making its contribution to the accomplishment of the task set by the party. Five years ago its specialists published the monograph "Global Problems of the Present Day," which was evaluated positively by the readers. The scientists continued the work, the result of which was the book in question.* The "Mysl" Publishing House plans the publication of further of the institute's studies devoted to global problems.

The priority place among such problems belongs, naturally, to the task of preventing nuclear war, halting the arms race and switching to disarmament. "The problem of war and peace," the monograph notes, "is now one of the principal, all-embracing problems of historical development and the central problem of world politics ensuing from the main regularities of our era. Survival of the human race has become the absolute priority in international affairs and an indispensable condition not only of the solution of all other problems of states' mutual relations but also of progressive social development in general" (pp 6-7).

Proceeding from the fact, the authors write, that only a "comprehensive class approach is capable of leading to a scientific answer to the question concerning the content of the objective prerequisites of the prevention of wars" (p 263), the book examines essentially all basic aspects of the problem of the removal of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. It characterizes the shifts in the correlation of forces in the world arena and the changes they have brought about in the system of international relations. The realization of Soviet foreign policy initiatives in the period since the 26th CPSU

* "Tsentralnaya problema mirovoy politiki: predotvrashcheniye yadernoy voyny" [Central Problem of World Politics: Prevention of Nuclear War], Ex. ed. O.N. Bykov, doctor of historical sciences, Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mysl," 1985, p 287.

Congress and the effectiveness of their impact on the international situation are shown in their dynamics. The causes of the sharply increased military danger--as a consequence of the policy adopted by the imperialist powers of confrontation with socialism and the spiraling of the arms race--are revealed.

From the viewpoint of the accomplishment of the main task--prevention of nuclear war--the monograph examines Soviet-American relations, the situation on the European continent and in the Asia-Pacific region and other questions.

The authors cogently criticize Western political scientists' concepts pertaining to the problems of war and peace, expose the myth of the "Soviet threat" and convincingly show the decisive role of the foreign policy of socialism in preventing a global catastrophe. "The main positive result of the foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state and the fraternal parties and states of the socialist community throughout the postwar period," the work emphasizes, "is that the socialist world has been able to worthily perform a duty of historic significance--preventing a new world war" (p 60).

Socialism's achievement of military-strategic parity with the opposite system serves, as the book notes, to curb the aggressive propensities of imperialism and is "a most important stabilizing factor throughout the system of international relations" (pp 23, 21).

The evolved correlation of military forces and the realities of the nuclear age are such that responsibility for the future of human civilization must, it would seem, prevail over the social, political and ideological differences of the two opposite systems. As far as the socialist countries are concerned, their position is clear. The declaration of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in October 1985 in Sofia said once again that no differences in world outlooks and political beliefs can prevent unification of efforts in the struggle against the threat of general annihilation looming over mankind.

American leaders also seemingly acknowledge that there could be no winners in a nuclear war and given assurances that they have no intention of encroaching on the social system of other states, interfering in their internal affairs and impeding the free will of the peoples.

"However, everything is more complex and contradictory," we read in the book, "in real life: finding a common denominator of the security interests of the socialist and capitalist states is far from easy. The main difficulty here is that socialist policy reflects the organic connection of the class interests of the progressive social system with the vital interests of mankind as a whole, but in imperialist policy the selfish interests of the most reactionary and aggressive forces of the monopoly bourgeoisie prevail over the interests of general peace and international security" (p 30). It is these militant forces of imperialism which are attempting, contrary to the realities of the era, to turn back the inexorable course of social development, not reckoning with the possible catastrophic consequences of such a course.

Putting their hopes in their allegedly unlimited technological and economic possibilities, they are endeavoring to acquire military superiority over socialism and, having created the springboard for a first strike in space, establish American hegemony on Earth.

"The first cause of the competition in the military sphere," the work emphasizes, "is the policy of imperialism" (p 29). The authors show which circles are interested in a constant spiraling of the arms race and how the mechanism of the military-industrial complex operates. A wealth of factual material is adduced indisputably testifying that the present U.S. Administration is moving to break up the existing military-strategic balance and is using for a cover the propaganda myth concerning the imaginary gap of the United States.

But what kind of "gap" have we here when in 10 years--from 1970 through 1980--American potential in nuclear warheads on strategic delivery systems practically doubled (p 87). This doubling occurred, furthermore, in a period of detente. It is not difficult to imagine what proportions military preparations have assumed given the present avowedly militarist course of the White House. It is planned appropriating in the next few years approximately \$1.8 trillion--mainly for the development and deployment of new types of weapons of mass extermination in the hope of creating a nuclear first strike potential (p 91). American intermediate-range missiles are being hastily deployed in West Europe for the same purpose.

The USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO specialists scrupulously analyze the balance of forces--both global (chapter III) and European (chapter IV)--prove the groundlessness of the positions of the United States and its NATO allies at the negotiations on different aspects of limiting the arms race--nuclear and conventional--and reveal the essence of the Soviet proposals. The data adduced in the monograph testify convincingly that Washington's actions create a direct threat to the security of the USSR and its allies, forcing them to adopt retaliatory measures.

Considering, however, the danger of the transfer of the arms race to a new dimension--space--the conclusion that the state of affairs in the sphere of the military balance is both the main indicator of Soviet-American relations and the main factor which will lead to their stabilization or destabilization (p 116) is pertinent and well-founded. Of course, the state of relations between the USSR and the United States is influenced by other factors also, but the most important prerequisite of their normalization is the renunciation of attempts to disrupt parity and strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

Something else is obvious also. Namely, the achievement between the two countries of accords leading to a sharp reduction in strategic arms, the nonmilitarization of space and a lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe would undoubtedly be positively reflected in an overall improvement in the political climate and would contribute to the return of international relations to the channel of detente. "Detente for us," the book emphasizes, "is a very broad concept. It incorporates general trends in the policy of states and their leaders geared not toward military

preparations and hostility toward other states but toward peaceful cooperation with them.... Detente is a constant endeavor to contribute by practical action to a limitation of the arms race and to strengthen security on the basis of a gradual deepening of mutual trust on a just and mutual basis" (p 263).

The work examines the positive and at the same time contradictory experience of detente in Europe and the development of the all-European process under the conditions of the increased confrontation of the states of the two systems. "The European continent has a special place," it observes, "in the struggle to prevent nuclear war. It is precisely here that both the objective and subjective prerequisites of political and military detente, which could perform a very considerable and, possibly, determining role in the accomplishment of the main historical task of our day, make themselves felt the most forcefully" (p 124).

Indeed, a nuclear conflict, should it erupt on European soil, under the conditions of the confrontation of two powerful military-political groupings, would inevitably lead to a global catastrophe. This is recognized in influential political circles of Western countries, and the divide between the two trends in the system of imperialism which V.I. Lenin termed "aggressive-bourgeois" and "pacifist" is manifested in particular relief in the example of Europe. In other words, "between those who are soberly taking into consideration the realities of the nuclear age and those who are unwilling to come to terms with these realities and hope to 'replay history' with the help of military-power methods" (p 128).

The Helsinki Final Act eloquently proves the possibility of the victory of commonsense and a constructive and realistic approach, despite all the attempts of world reaction to discredit detente.

The experience of the struggle for the creation of a system of European security and cooperation, the book observes, could also be used to good effect in other regions, in the Asia-Pacific region particularly, with regard, of course, for the specific conditions in which the peoples of this gigantic area of the world live.

Investigating the system of contemporary international relations, the authors analyze various factors capable of destabilizing the situation and leading to an increase in the threat of a general nuclear conflict. The work formulates the Marxist viewpoint of the nature of crises and conflicts in world politics and exposes concepts prevalent current in bourgeois political science. Thus Western specialists "for the purpose of the ideological indoctrination of the population actually equate conflict and contemporary international relations as a whole and reduce the entire diversity of international relations solely and exclusively to conflict" (p 205). The monograph emphasizes that attempts to absolutize the significance of conflicts in international relations wittingly or unwittingly lead to the legalization, as it were, of a global nuclear conflict also, portraying it as fatally predetermined.

The authors show convincingly the possibility and necessity of the settlement of the most acute international or regional conflicts by political means, preventing their escalation to the point beyond which a swift and irreversible slide toward nuclear war could begin. The significance of the subjective factor, including such a component thereof as the "flexible political wind" of state leaders, is noted here (p 258).

In a word, the pivotal thought running through all chapters of the work in question is that the removal of nuclear war is possible. However antagonistic the main contradiction between socialism and capitalism, however great the threat to peace created by the policy of aggressive imperialist circles, war is not a fatal inevitability. The study made by specialists of the institute convincingly confirms the tremendous theoretical and ideological-political significance of this conclusion contained in the draft new version of the CPSU Program.

The growing potential of the peace forces lends credence to the victory of common sense and the ultimate establishment in international relations of the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. This potential has been reinforced considerably by the large-scale, truly radical peace initiatives which the Soviet Union has put forward recently, which M.S. Gorbachev has called a "program for the recovery of the explosive international situation." Profound interest in the preservation of peace and a halt to the arms race is being displayed by the overwhelming majority of Asian, African and Latin American states. Antiwar movements of the broadest people's masses on all continents have become a long-term and influential political factor. Incidentally, for the purpose of a fuller characterization of the role of the mass movements in preventing nuclear war this topic could surely have been given an independent section in the study.

As a whole, the monograph prepared by the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMD undoubtedly represents both a theoretical and practical value and is a specific contribution to the elaboration of key problems of world politics being undertaken by Soviet scholars approaching the 27th CPSU Congress.

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RELATED ISSUES

THE SPD'S LAFONTAINE WANTS U.S. MISSILES WITHDRAWN

Explain Reasons

DD41410 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1410 GMT 21 Mar 88

[Interview with Socialist Minister President Oskar Lafontaine by correspondent Lickmann on the "Deutschland und die Welt" program; date not given -- recorded]

[Excerpt] [Lickmann] It was the first time in a long time that Lafontaine commented publicly on disarmament policy. It was at the SPD land party convention in Saarbrücken. His exact words were: In the event that the German Social Democrats take over the government, the medium-range missiles that have been deployed recently will be withdrawn. Lafontaine explained:

The decision is made by the party convention, which finally decided on weapons issues. You must know that the SPD shared the majority's two-track decision for a long time when they held government responsibility, because they hoped that two-track decisions would lead to disarmament. As we predicted, there is no disarmament, just as in the past 40 years there has been no disarmament. Armament just keeps going on and on unabated. For that reason the SPD rejected deployment at the time, and what was decided then must be implemented in government work.

[Lickmann] However, at that time it was impossible to assume that there would be deployment. Was it not a different situation then? Can one simply say today in retrospect, let us take the former decision as a valid current position, even after deployment?

[Lafontaine] At that time it was clear that development would take place, it was an issue at the party convention, and the SPD said no to deployment. A party can only remain credible to the voter if it carries out in its government activities what it has determined in decisions and what it presents as its program.

[Lickmann] Do you not think that with that attitude you could get into a discussion -- within the SPD and with Kru -- that might be unpleasant for your party?

[Lafontaine] No, not at all. The party's decision is clear, and everyone who participated in making that decision surely will support it.

[Lickmann] That means you assume that Kru will also support your view?

[Lafontaine] Of course. He said that in several interviews. Johannes Kru supported that decision; thus, it goes without saying that he will execute it in his government work.

Further Report

130714Z Saarburg SPA to German 1257 GMT 22 Mar 88

[Excerpt] Saarbrücken 22 Mar -- In the event of taking over the Bonn government, the SPD would dismantle the medium-range missiles stationed in the Federal Republic since 1949. This was announced today by the Saarland SPD Chairman and Minister President Oskar Lafontaine at a regional party congress in Saarbrücken.

Lafontaine said he is in favor of political membership in NATO "but not military integration, and also nuclear-free." This position is exactly the same as that put forth by Spain.

Press Comments

DN150743 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network to German 0605 GMT 24 Mar 88

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Saarland Minister President Lafontaine's security policy statement is one of today's editorial topics.

SÜDDUTSCHE ZEITUNG writes: When Johannes Rau, SPD chancellor candidate, visited Washington early in February, he made it clear after his meeting with President Reagan that if he wins the election he will not handle the issue of the U.S. medium-range missiles and cruise missiles deployed on German soil as solely that of the Federal Republic. Oskar Lafontaine, the Saarland SPD chairman took a different view at the Saarbrücken land party convention this weekend. He announced that in the event of SPD taking over in Bonn, the SPD will implement its decision to withdraw the newly deployed medium-range missiles. Where does the SPD stand for? And who in the SPD has the final say in security policy? It seems urgent to clear that up. And that is true of other basic issues. At the convention Lafontaine again advocated the withdrawal of the FRG from military integration and further political membership in the Western defense alliance.

RHEINISCHE POST adds: The Federal Republic would be deprived of all that has so far guaranteed its security toward Moscow. Isolated, the FRG would be too weak to resist the expected pressure from Moscow in the long run. That would not mean war, but we could easily be pushed into a socialism presumably closer to GDR socialism than to the one of the SPD stands for. No one should be ashamed of fearing such a development. Lafontaine cannot be dismissed as lone wolf. He represents a strong tendency within his party. His political ideas can easily be compared with those of the Greens. That brings up the question of what SPD chancellor candidate Rau has to say about it, what weight Rau yields in the party, what his word is worth, and what his attitude toward NATO is.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRC TAKES ON CONFERENCE TO CURB ARMS RACE

CHUNGKING Beijing KINBER in English UNIS COM 3 Apr 88

[Text] United Nations, April 4 (KINBER) -- China said today that the checking of the arms race and realization of disarmament are conducive not only to the alleviation of international tension but also to the growth of international economy and social progress. Addressing the second session of the preparatory committee for the international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development here, Liang Tefan, Chinese deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, urged the Soviet Union and the United States to take the lead in drastically reducing at an early date all types of their armaments, nuclear armaments in particular.

He too urged powers should also "refrain from conducting the arms race in outer space and divert the resources thus saved to domestic development and assistance to developing countries for their economic and social development," he said. The aggregated military expenditure of the whole world has reached 1,000 billion U.S. dollars and weapons of all kinds are developing at an unprecedented scale and speed, seriously menacing world peace and security and gulping down enormous resources that are essential for economic and social development.

At the same time, the world economy has been growing at a sluggish pace. Perennial international economic problems are troubling various countries, leaving a serious adverse effect on the development process of the developing countries.

"Pending the realization of complete and thorough disarmament," Liang said, "The United Nations should encourage all the countries, particularly the militarily significant countries," to effect a curb of their own arms and on their military expenditures when conditions permit and adopt measures that are conducive to the economic and social development of their own countries.

The Chinese ambassador reiterated that "China pursues a foreign policy of peace, opposes arms race and does not participate in it." "We need a long-standing and peaceful international environment to develop our economy and build up our own country," he added. He said that since 1979, the percentage of China's military expenditure in the whole government budget has been declining year after year, and "no major increase in this regard is expected in the next five years". Liang stated that the Chinese delegation "is ready to join the other delegations in making good preparations so as to ensure a complete success for the conference."

The International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, which was decided upon by the 40th session of the U.N. General Assembly, is to be held from July 15 to August 2 in Paris. High-ranking political leaders from various countries are expected to attend the conference.

INDIA REFRAINS FROM COMMENT ON REAGAN MESSAGE

Newman 348 KHW in English 18 Mar 86 p 1

[Article by G.E. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, March 17
The message from the U.S. President to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the text of the Prime Minister's reply to the U.S. President, and the text of the U.S. President's reply to the Prime Minister's reply, are all contained in the U.S. President's message to the Prime Minister.

At the time, Rajiv Gandhi has been the first to the United States, a first that is significant in the history of India's relations with the United States. The Prime Minister's message to the U.S. President is a message of friendship and cooperation, and it is a message that is significant in the history of India's relations with the United States.

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